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Rhode Island's Judicial Nominating
Commission: Can "Reform"
Become Reality?
Michael J. Yelnosky*
"Well done is better than well said."1
INTRODUCTION
It seems an appropriate time to assess preliminarily Rhode Is-
land's new judicial selection process. In just two years, fourteen
judicial vacancies have been filled using the new process, including
three on the five-member supreme court. 2
* Assistant Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.S. 1982,
University of Vermont; J.D. 1987, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to
Michael A. Kelly, the Chair of Rhode Island's Judicial Nominating Commission,
and Kathleen A. Sousa, the Commission's legal assistant, for fulfilling my requests
for information. My thanks also to Richard Morris for his excellent research
assistance.
I am delighted to have the opportunity to contribute to the inaugural issue of
this review, our law school's first forum for articles addressing legal issues of inter-
est to Rhode Island. Hopefully, the resources of the law school, the faculty, and the
student body will regularly be used to try to improve the administration of justice
here. "The mission of a law school is not just to educate persons . . . but also to
contribute to and enhance the legal culture of every jurisdiction which the law
school touches." Joseph R. Weisberger, Foreword, 1 R.W.U. L. Rev. vii, ix (1996);
see also D. Morgan McVicar, State's First Law School Begins Classes in Bristol,
Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 24, 1993, at Al, A6 (describing this law school's potential to
improve the quality of the legal culture in Rhode Island). Some observers have
argued the Rhode Island legal system is in need of significant reform. E.g., Alan
M. Dershowitz, Reversal of Fortune 309 (1986) (questioning the overall quality of
justice in Rhode Island); Roger Williams Law, Prov. J. Bull., Sept. 6, 1993, at A6
(expressing hope that Roger Williams University School of Law can help elevate
the professional and ethical standards of the state's legal system "[iun view of...
the disheartening news about the court system").
1. Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richards Almanac (1937) (quoted in Burton Ste-
venson, Home Book of Quotations 2227 (1967)).
2. A Judicial Nominating Commission is central to the process. Because the
enabling legislation is silent on many important aspects of the Commission's work,
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I have two objectives. The first is to recount comprehensively
the work of the Judicial Nominating Commission since its incep-
tion, focusing on both the procedural issues it addressed and its
selections. 3 Thus, Part I is an historical record that can hopefully
inform subsequent discussions of the efficacy of the new selection
process. My second objective is to offer some preliminary assess-
ments of the new selection process. I do so in Part II, where I also
respond to some of the comments made by other observers. 4 I con-
clude that although many improvements can and should continue
to be made, the new selection process represents a significant step
in the right direction. Specifically, the new process 1) reduces the
likelihood that partisan politics will be the determining factor in
judicial selection, 2) improves the chances that lawyers of all per-
sonal and professional backgrounds will be considered and selected
for judicial vacancies, and 3) vastly increases opportunities for
public participation and oversight, which should increase public
confidence in the judiciary.
I. THE WORK OF THE JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION
A. The Birth of the Commission
Chief Justice Thomas Fay's resignation in September 1993 set
the stage for changes in Rhode Island's judicial selection process.5
the Commission had to formulate its own procedures for advertising vacancies,
accepting applications, screening applicants, voting on applicants, accepting public
comment, and otherwise opening its work to the public. The Commission has also
sought and received one advisory opinion from the Rhode Island Supreme Court
and two advisory opinions from the Ethics Commission.
3. As a representative of Common Cause of Rhode Island, I have attended
most meetings of the Commission since it began its work in June of 1994. I am a
member of the governing board of Common Cause, but the comments in this article
are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Common Cause of Rhode
Island. No member of that organization saw this article before it was published.
4. Barton Jenks, whose comments about the new judicial selection law ap-
pear in this volume, Barton P. Jenks, III, Rhode Island's New Judicial Merit Selec-
tion Law, 1 R.W.U. L. Rev. 63 (1996) and I previously addressed some of these
issues in editorials in the Providence Journal Bulletin. Compare Barton P. Jenks,
III, The Flaws in Rhode Island's New Judicial Selection Process, Prov. J. Bull.,
Feb. 14, 15, 1995, at A9, All with Michael J. Yelnosky, A Noncynical Look at Judi-
cial Reform, Prov. J. Bull., March 21, 1995, at All. I prefer to use this space to
offer a detailed account and assessment of the work of the Nominating Commis-
sion rather than to focus on Mr. Jenks's critique. I will address his comments
where they are implicated by my evaluation of the new selection process.
5. Russell Garland, R.I. Changes the Method of Selecting its Judges, Prov. J.
Bull., June 3, 1994, at Al [hereinafter R.I. Changes Method].
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He was the second consecutive chief justice of the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island to resign in the face of allegations of official mis-
conduct.6 On June 2, 1994, legislation created a commission em-
powered to screen applicants for vacancies on all of Rhode Island's
courts. 7 The commission must recommend three to five names to
the governor for every vacancy.8 The governor's selection from
those recommended must be confirmed by the Senate, 9 except in
the case of supreme court justices, who must also be confirmed by
the House.10
Formerly, the governor had the statutory power to select
judges for the lower courts, subject to senate confirmation."
Rhode Island's Constitution formerly gave the House and Senate
sitting in grand committee the power to select supreme court jus-
tices.12 The new selection statute controlled lower court selections
immediately, but the new process did not go into effect for vacan-
cies on the supreme court until November 1994, when the voters
ratified a constitutional amendment.' 3
6. Scott MacKay, House Approves Bill to Change Judicial Selection, Prov. J.
Bull., May 27, 1994, at B5. Justice Fay had established a secret court fund that he
managed with his court administrator, former Speaker of the House Matthew
Smith. Chief Justice Fay's predecessor, Joseph Bevilaqua, was facing impeach-
ment because of his links with organized crime figures and his use of court employ-
ees for personal errands. Id.
7. R.I. Changes Method, supra note 5, at Al.
8. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-16.1-5(a), 8-16.1-6(a) (Supp. 1994).
9. Id. § 8-16.1-6(c).
10. Id. § 8-16.1-5(c).
11. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-2(a) (1985) (superior court); id. § 8-8-7(a) (district
court); id. § 8-10-11 (family court); id. § 28-30-2 (1968) (workers' compensation
court); id. § 31-43-1 (administrative adjudication court). Each has been super-
seded by R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-6(a).
12. R.I. Const. art. X, §§ 4, 5 amended by R.I. Const. art. X, §§ 4, 5.
13. R.L Changes Method, supra note 5, at Al. Rhode Island's Constitution
now provides:
The governor shall fill any vacancy of any justice of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court by nominating, on the basis of merit, a person from a list
submitted by an independent non-partisan judicial nominating commis-
sion, and by and with the advice of the senate, and by and with the sepa-
rate advice and consent of the house of representatives, shall appoint said
person as a justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The governor
shall fill any vacancy of any judge of the Rhode Island Superior Court,
Family Court, District, Workers' Compensation Court, Administrative
Adjudication Court, or any other state court which the general assembly
may from time to time establish by nominating on the basis of merit, a
person from a list submitted by the aforesaid judicial nominating commis-
sion, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint
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The nine members of the commission were sworn in on June
15, 1994.14 All were appointed by the governor. The governor has
complete discretion to make four appointments, except that three
of those appointees must be attorneys.15 The remaining five com-
missioners are selected by the governor from lists forwarded by
legislative leaders. 16 Members serve staggered four year terms.17
said person to the court where the vacancy occurs. The powers, duties,
and composition of the judicial nominating commission shall be defined by
statute.
R.I. Const. art. X, § 4.
14. Russell Garland, Commissioners to Screen Judges are Sworn In, Prov. J.
Bull., June 16, 1994, at D20.
15. § 8-16.1-2(a)(2)(ii)-(iii). Governor Sundlun's attorney appointments were
Michael Kelly, who was then a partner at Adler, Pollock & Sheehan; Lise Ges-
cheidt, a criminal defense lawyer in private practice; and Girard Visconti, a part-
ner at Visconti & Petrocelli. Sundlun's non-lawyer appointment was Pablo
Rodriguez, M.D., medical director of Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island. The
governor exercised his power under § 8-16.1-2(e) to name Michael Kelly chair.
Commissioners to Screen Judges, supra note 14, at D1.
16. The speaker of the house submits a list of three attorneys to the governor.
§ 8-16.1-2(a)(1)(i). From that list Governor Sundlun selected William Devereux, a
partner at McGovern, Noel & Benik. Commissioners to Screen Judges, supra note
14, at D1. The majority leader of the senate submits a list of three persons who
may or may not be attorneys. § 8-16.1-2(a)(1)(ii). The governor selected attorney
Peter McGinn from that list, who is a partner at Tillinghast, Collins & Graham.
Commissioners to Screen Judges, supra note 14 at D1. The speaker and majority
leader also jointly submit a list of four non-attorneys. § 8-16.1-2(a)(1)(iii). The gov-
ernor selected Sharon Burgess from that list, a blood transfusion specialist with
the Rhode Island Blood Bank. Commissioners to Screen Judges, supra, note 14 at
D1. The minority leader in the house submits a list of three non-attorneys. § 8-
16.1-2(a)(1)(iv). The governor selected Barbara Colvin from that list, a retired
nurse who was formerly assistant director of surgical nursing at Rhode Island Hos-
pital. Commissioners to Screen Judges, supra, note 14 at D1. The minority leader
in the senate also submits a list of three non-attorneys. § 8-16.1-2(a)(1)(v). The
governor selected George Hartmann from that list, professor emeritus of biology at
Rhode Island College. Commissioners to Screen Judges, supra, note 14 at D1.
17. To stagger the initial terms, some had to be abbreviated. One of the gover-
nor's attorney appointments and the appointment that came from the house mi-
nority leader's list served one year terms. Therefore, they have already been
replaced. § 8-16.1-2(b)(1). Governor Almond named Alan Flink, a partner at Ed-
wards & Angell, to replace Girard Visconti, a Sundlun appointee. Barbara Colvin,
who was chosen by Governor Sundlun from the list forwarded by the house minor-
ity leader, was replaced by David Campbell, vice-president for human resources
and employee development at Milford-Whitinsville Regional Hospital. Scott Mac-
Kay and Russell Garland, Flink and Campbell Added to Judicial Nominating
Panel, Prov. J. Bull., June 26, 1995, at B3.
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B. The First Wave
1. Screening
After the commissioners were named, Governor Sundlun noti-
fied the Commission of eight vacancies-four in the superior court,
three in the family court, and one in the district court.18 Before it
could begin selecting nominees, the Commission first adopted tem-
porary emergency rules and regulations to guide its work.19 The
Commission then solicited applications for the vacancies by pub-
lishing notices of vacancy in "newspapers circulated throughout
the State of Rhode Island including minority publications." 20 The
Commission prepared application and financial disclosure forms
modeled after those suggested by the American Judicature Soci-
ety.21 More than 185 persons applied for the eight vacancies. 22
Given the large number of applicants, the chair exercised the
discretion given by the temporary rules to "appoint one or more
subcommittees to review completed questionnaires and back-
ground materials as part of the screening process."23 The Commis-
sion narrowed the field to approximately eighty applicants, whom
18. Russell Garland, New Commission Nominates Judges, Prov. J. Bull., Aug.
5, 1994, at Al. Under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-6(a), "[tjhe governor shall immedi-
ately notify the commission of any vacancy or prospective vacancy of a judge of any
state court." Id.
19. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-3(b)
(1993), an agency may adopt a temporary emergency rule without the notice and
comment period normally required. Id.
20. Draft Uniform Rules for the Judicial Nominating Commission, § I, p.1
(July 18, 1994) [hereinafter Draft Rules]. Ultimately, the commissioners adopted
a rule requiring the Commission to publish the notice of vacancy, at a minimum, in
Rhode Island Lawyer's Weekly, Providence Journal Bulletin, Newport Daily News,
Pawtuxet Valley Times, Westerly Sun, Pawtucket Times, Woonsocket Call, Provi-
dence American, Shoreline en Espafiol, Portugese American Journal, La Precen-
cian, and The Echo. Uniform Rules for the Judicial Nominating Commission, § I,
p.1 (Jan. 19, 1995).
21. Marla N. Greenstein, American Judicature Society, Handbook for Judicial
Nominating Commissioners 31-33 (1985).
22. New Commission Nominates Judges, supra note 18, at Al.
23. Draft Rules, supra note 20, § I, p. 1. That provision still exists. Uniform
Rules for the Judicial Nominating Commission, § I, p. 1 (Jan. 19, 1995).
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it subsequently interviewed. 24 The Commission publicized only
the names of applicants selected for interviews. 25
In an attempt to promote free discussion between Commis-
sioners and applicants during interviews, the Commission created
a presumption in favor of private interviews. That presumption
could be overcome only if an applicant chose a public interview. 26
24. New Commission Nominates Judges, supra note 18, at Al. The individu-
als chosen for interviews for superior court were District Court Judge Edward Clif-
ton, Howard Croll, District Court Judge Gilbert Indeglia, Michael Silverstein,
Netti Vogel, Frank Williams, Stephen Fortunato Jr., Scott Keefer, Paul Lietar,
District Court Judge Patricia Moore, Michael McElroy, Susan McGuirl, District
Court Judge Robert Pirraglia, Dennis Roberts II, Anthony DiGioia, Barbara Hurst,
District Court Judge Walter Gorman, William Brody, Richard Kyte, Kent Willever,
James Ryan, Kenneth Madden, David Martin and James O'Neil. Russell Garland,
Panel To Nominate Judges Seeks Opinions on Candidates, Prov. J. Bull., July 19,
1994, at C7.
For family court the Commission interviewed Nancy Palmisciano, District
Court Judge Gilbert Rocha, Robert Silva, Marilyn Shannon McConaghy, Joseph
Roszkowski, Ira Schreiber, John Farley, Workers' Compensation Court Judge
John Rotondi Jr., John Mutter, Laureen D'Ambra, Joseph Keough, Mary Nagle,
George Muksian, Frank Cenerini, Lidia Sanchez, Barbara Margolis, Michael Mc-
Carthy, Sandra Lanni, Edward Newman, Alfred Rego, Maureen Hobson and Rossi
Lee Harris. Id.
For district court the Commission interviewed Elaine Bucci, Patricia Byrnes,
Frank Cenerini, Gregory Dias, John Farley, Family Court Judge Michael B. Forte,
William Gallogly, Kevin Gavin, John Hardiman, District Court Special Master Jo-
seph Ippolito, James Jerue, Joseph Keough, Nicholas Long, Kenneth Madden,
John McLaughlin, George Muksian, John Mutter, Everett Petronio, former Sen.
John Sabatini, Lidia Sanchez, Robert Silva, Michael Stone, John Turano, Robert
Weisberger, Kent Willever, David Kerins, Ralph DellaRosa, James Donnelly, Mer-
lyn O'Keefe and Administrative Adjudication Court Judge Marjorie R. Yashar. Id.
25. "The list of all persons to be interviewed shall be made public as soon as is
practical and the Commission shall encourage written public comment regarding
the qualifications of said interviewees." Draft Rules, supra note 20, at § III. This
provision still exists. Uniform Rules for the Judicial Nominating Commission, § I,
p. 1 (Jan. 19, 1995).
The Commission's Chair, Michael Kelly, expressed concern that an applicant's
professional reputation would be harmed if the public knew the applicant was not
selected for an interview. Commissioner Peter McGinn added that he did not see
any great public interest in revealing the names of those who did not get by an
initial review. Panel to Nominate Judges, supra note 24, at C7. An editorial in the
Newport Daily News agreed with McGinn. Judicial Panel Starts Off on Wrong
Foot, Newport Daily News, July 19, 1994, at A7 (explaining that "there is no great
harm in declining to release the names of those who are not interviewed.").
26. Panel to Nominate State Judges, supra note 24, at C7. The Newport Daily
News editorialized in favor of public interviews. "Rhode Islanders," it wrote, "long
accustomed to backroom deals that result in judicial appointments, soon will learn
to distrust a selection commission that meets secretly to weed out applicants." Ju-
dicial Panel Starts Off on Wrong Foot, Newport Daily News, July 19, 1994, at A7.
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Ultimately, more than half the interviews were public.27 Each in-
terview lasted approximately fifteen minutes.
The Commission solicited written comment on the interview-
ees from the public. It invited District Court Chief Judge Albert
DeRobbio and Family Court Chief Judge Jeremiah S. Jeremiah to
instruct the commissioners on how to identify the characteristics of
a good judge. During Judge DeRobbio's presentation, commis-
sioner Peter McGinn invited him to meet privately with the com-
mission, "no minutes," to help the Commission select the best
candidates. 28 After seeking legal advice, the Commission declined
to hold this private session with Judge DeRobbio. 29
After interviewing candidates and reviewing application
forms, financial statements, police background checks, and written
comments from the public, the Commission voted on the nominees
to send to the governor. 30 The Commission's rules required the
vote to take place in public, but the rules permitted the Commis-
sion to deliberate in closed session.31 On August 4, 1994, the Com-
mission voted to send thirty-nine nominees to the governor for the
eight vacancies: nineteen for the four superior court vacancies; 32
fifteen for the three family court vacancies; 33 and five for the dis-
trict court vacancy. 34
27. Russell Garland, A New Process of Nominating Judges Tested, Prov. J.
Bull., Sept. 26, 1994, at A3.
28. Russell Garland, 2 Top Judges Offer Insights on Judicial Candidates,
Prov. J. Bull., July 24, 1994, at D8.
29. The Commission's Counsel expressed concern the meeting would violate
the Open Meetings Law and the Commission's own rules. New Commission Nomi-
nates Judges, supra note 18, at A8.
30. Id.
31. Draft Rules, supra note 20, at § V.
32. The Commission voted in favor of District Court Judge Edward Clifton,
Netti Vogel, Frank Williams, Stephen Fortunato Jr., Michael Silverstein, Richard
Gonella, Kenneth Madden, District Court Judge Walter Gorman, David Martin,
Robin Feder, Paul Lietar, Sandra Lanni, District Court Judge Gilbert Indeglia,
Susan McGuirl, James E. O'Neil, District Court Judge Patricia Moore, Kent Wil-
lever, Michael McElroy, and James Leavey. New Commission Nominates Judges,
supra note 18, at Al.
33. The Commission voted in favor of District Court Judge Gilbert Rocha,
Frank Cenerini, Francis Murray, Joseph Keough, Marilyn Shannon McConaghy,
Workers' Compensation Court Judge John Rotondi Jr., John Mutter, Richard
Kyte, Vincent DiMonte, Jack McMahon, Ira Schreiber, Sharon O'Keefe, James
Donnelly, Joseph Roszkowski, and John Farley. Id.
34. The Commission voted in favor of John McLoughlin, Peter Nolan, Frank
Cenerini, John Hardiman, and Elaine Bucci. Id.
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Every nominee was selected by unanimous vote of the mem-
bers of the Commission, although the statute requires only that
"[a]ll names submitted to the governor by the commission shall be
approved by at least five (5) members of the commission voting in
favor of each selection."3 5 Chairman Michael Kelly3 6 explained
that "although there was no advance agreement about whom to
nominate, when we sat down to go through things, we basically
came up with a consensus of who the best candidates were."3 7
The Providence Journal Bulletin editorial board was not im-
pressed with the initial work of the Commission. It wrote that,
[t]he tenor of the commission's selections is, to put it mildly,
anti-climactic, given all the talk about how this new proce-
dure would upgrade the quality of state judges.... The com-
missions' lists contain enough competent people whose names
the governor can, without embarrassment, send along for the
Senate's consideration. But the results so far reinforce skep-
ticism about the value of creating an appointed commission
- that is not responsible to the public and conducts many of
its crucial deliberations in private - and allowing that panel
to restrict the judicial nominating authority of the governor,
who at least is subject to the public's judgment as expressed
in the voting booth.38
2. Nomination and Confirmation
Governor Sundlun nominated Netti Vogel, Michael Silver-
stein, District Court Judge Edward Clifton and Stephen Fortunato
for the superior court vacancies. He nominated Municipal Court
Judge John Mutter, District Court Judge Gilbert Rocha, and Work-
ers' Compensation Court Judge John Rotondi, Jr. for the family
court vacancies. He nominated Frank Cenerini for the district
court.3 9 The nominations of Judges Clifton, Rocha, and Rotondi
created the possibility of three additional vacancies - two on the
Instead of creating separate lists of three to five candidates for each vacancy
on the superior and family courts, the commission consolidated all the superior
court nominees onto one list and all the family court nominees onto one list. The
Commission sent the list of names to the governor, "in alphabetical order without
indicating any preference of the Commission." Draft Rules, supra note 20, at § VI.
35. § 8-16.1-2(d).
36. See supra note 15.
37. New Commission Nominates Judges, supra note 18, at A8.
38. The Usual Suspects, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 11, 1994, at A14.
39. Garland, supra note 27 at A3.
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district court and one on the workers' compensation court. The
Governor asked the Commission to begin immediately to screen
candidates for these prospective vacancies. 40
The Commission did not conduct new interviews or solicit new
applications for the two "prospective" district court vacancies be-
cause it had already solicited applications for a vacancy there. In-
stead, it deliberated and voted unanimously to send one list of ten
names to the governor. Four of the ten names were on the original
list to fill the district court vacancy. 41 Governor Sundlun nomi-
nated Elaine Bucci and John McGloughlin. 42
In the meantime, the Commission commenced and completed
the solicitation, application, and screening process for the prospec-
tive workers' compensation court vacancy. On August 19, 1994,
the commissioners voted, again unanimously, to place the names of
William Buckley, Lane Newquist, and George Salem, Jr. on a list
to be sent to the governor. They were selected from among eleven
applicants chosen for interviews. 43 The governor nominated
George Salem, Jr.4 4
On August 24, 1994, the Senate received the governor's nomi-
nations. The statute requires the Senate to conduct "an investiga-
40. Governor Sundlun "telegraphed" these selections only one day after re-
ceiving the Commission's lists by informing the Commission that there were "sev-
eral sitting judges in the district court and one in the workers' compensation court"
on the Commission's lists and that he had "in the past frequently elevated sitting
judges to other courts ... [because] prior judicial experience is a valuable asset for
a judicial candidate to possess." Letter from Governor Bruce Sundlun to Michael
Kelly, Chairman, Judicial Nominating Commission (Aug. 5, 1994). Even before
selecting the sitting judges he asked the Commission to commence proceedings to
fill "up to two (2) prospective vacancies in the district court and one (1) in the
workers' compensation court." Id.
41. Judicial Panel Sends Sundlun 10 Names for District Court, Prov. J. Bull.,
Aug. 17, 1994, at A9. The four former nominees were Elaine Bucci, John
Hardiman, John McLoughlin and Peter Nolan. The additional six were Patricia
Byrnes, Robin Feder, Richard Gonnella, Joseph Ippolito, Kenneth Madden and
Michael Stone. Id.
42. Russell Garland, Senate Receives Sundlun Judicial Picks, Prov. J. Bull.,
Aug. 25, 1994, at D17.
43. Judicial Panel Suggests 3 for Vacancy, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 22, 1994, at C4.
The Commission interviewed Paul Bordieni, William Buckley, Dianne Craven,
Harold Demopulos, Elaine Giannini, Peter Haydon, Vincent Kane, Lane Newquist,
Diane Pearson, John Sabatini, and George Salem, Jr. Letter from Michael Kelly,
Chairman, Judicial Nominating Commission to Professor Michael Yelnosky, Roger
Williams University School of Law (Jan. 19, 1996).
44. Senate Receives Sundlun Judicial Picks, supra note 42, at D17.
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tion and public hearing on the question of the qualifications of the
nominee or nominees."45 Because the Commission had not held
public hearings on the candidates, "[tihe [Senate] Judiciary Com-
mittee hearings [were] the first and only public hearings on the
nominees."46
After its hearings the Senate Judiciary Committee recom-
mended that the full Senate confirm nine nominees: Michael Sil-
verstein, Netti Vogel, District Court Judge Edward Clifton, and
Stephen Fortunato for the superior court; District Court Judge Gil-
bert Rocha and Municipal Court Judge John Mutter for the family
court; and Elaine Bucci, Frank Cenerini, and John McLoughlin for
the district court.47  Those nominees were subsequently
confirmed. 48
The Senate Judiciary Committee voted to reject Workers'
Compensation Court Judge John Rotondi's nomination to family
court. Three senators testified that they had heard from lawyers
opposed to Judge Rotondi who wished to remain anonymous for
fear that they might ultimately appear before Rotondi in family
court. 49 The Senate Judiciary Committee learned that Judge
Rotondi's ex-wife, Susan Epstein, had sent a letter to the Nominat-
ing Commission, in which Epstein asserted that the judge was not
45. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-6(d) (Supp. 1994).
46. Senate Receives Sundlun Judicial Picks, supra note 42, at D17.
47. Russell Garland, Senate Panel Approves Four of Sundlun's Court Nomi-
nees, Prov. J. Bull., Sept. 1, 1994, at D21; Russell Garland, Judiciary Panel Ap-
proves Four Court Nominees, Prov. J. Bull., Sept. 9, 1994, at C7.
48. A New Process of Nominating Judges Tested, supra note 27, at Al. Of the
nominees confirmed, only Judge Rocha was the subject of some controversy. Four
senators announced that they opposed his nomination to family court because he
had been nominated to the district court less than one year before and he had
voted against fair housing bills in the 1960s while he was a state senator. Judge
Rocha's Nomination to Family Court Draws Fire, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 17, 1994, at
D9. Joseph Fowlkes Jr., president of the Providence branch of the NAACP, testi-
fied that Rocha's opposition to that legislation should disqualify him. District
Court Chief Judge Albert DeRobbio testified on Judge Rocha's behalf, reporting
that Rocha received the highest possible score in an internal district court evalua-
tion. Judge Rocha testified that his vote against the fair housing bills was a mis-
take. Senate Panel Approves Four of Sundlun's Court Nominees, Prov. J. Bull.,
Sept. 1, 1994, at D21.
49. Russell Garland, Allegations Against Rotondi Probed in Nomination Pro-
cess, Prov. J. Bull., Sept. 8, 1994, at D20. Michael Kelly, the Nominating Commis-
sion's Chair, told reporters that no attorney ever submitted adverse comments to
the Commission, even though it had solicited written comment on all applicants it
interviewed and had assured the public the letters would be kept confidential. Id.
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fit to serve on the family court. Chairman Kelly of the Commission
told reporters that the Commission contacted and questioned indi-
viduals about Epstein's allegations and concluded that "the situa-
tion was a domestic dispute that had no bearing on Rotondi's
fitness to be a Family Court judge."50
The Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony from Judge
Rotondi's twenty-five-year-old daughter, who told the Committee
that Rotondi was qualified to sit on the family court.51 The Com-
mittee also heard testimony from Susan Epstein and Judge
Rotondi. Ms. Epstein testified that the judge was not fit to serve on
the family court because of his conduct as a husband and father.52
Judge Rotondi responded that he was the victim of his ex-wife's
inability to put their divorce behind her. 53 After the Senate Judici-
ary Committee voted 10 to 7 to reject Rotondi, Governor Sundlun
withdrew the nomination. 54
The selection statute provides that "[i]f the nominee is rejected
by the senate, the commission shall submit a new list of three (3) to
50. Id. Commissioner Lise Gescheidt, who received the letter from Rotondi's
ex-wife and passed it on to the other commissioners, eventually testified before the
Judiciary Committee, as did Chairman Kelly. Kelly explained that the Commis-
sion called Rotondi back for a second interview to question him about Epstein's
allegations and was satisfied they had no merit. He explained that the Commis-
sion did not formally question Susan Epstein because it did not have the authority
to hold hearings. Russell Garland, Letters Imperil Rotondi Approval as Judge,
Prov. J. Bull., Sept. 15, 1994, at D13.
51. Letters Imperil Rotondi Approval as Judge, supra note 50 at D13. She
testified that "my parents got divorced 15 years ago and it was a crazy time for
everybody," but that her father is "a good and fair person and he takes his job
seriously." Id. She specifically responded to an allegation in her mother's letter to
the Judicial Nominating Commission that Judge Rotondi "emotionally battered"
her. She denied that she ever said it and testified that her father never emotion-
ally abused her. Id.
52. Scott MacKay, Judgeship Nomination Withdrawn, Prov. J. Bull., Sept. 16,
1994, at Al, A12. She testified that Rotondi is prejudiced against women, showed
little pride, no joy, and a total lack of interest in his children, engaged in marital
infidelity, emotionally battered her and her daughter, and often missed child-sup-
port payments. Id.
53. Judge Rotondi explained that he had a good relationship with his daugh-
ter and that his estrangement from his son resulted from the fact that Epstein
made the child choose sides after the divorce. Judge Rotondi said that he had
attended therapy sessions with his wife to resurrect the marriage and that he was
never more than two weeks late with support payments. Id.
54. Id. at Al. Judge Rotondi responded that he had been the victim of innu-
endo, hearsay, rumor, and politics, and that he was rejected "not because of my
ability, but because I am a divorced man." Id. at A12.
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five (5) candidates to the governor for the purpose of nomina-
tion."55 The statute does not explain what happens in the event a
nominee withdraws during the confirmation process. Chairman
Kelly; William Poore, the Commission's legal counsel; and Eliza-
beth Myers, Governor Sundlun's legal counsel, all agreed that be-
cause Judge Rotondi had not been rejected by the full Senate, the
Commission was not required to give the governor a new list of
family court nominees.5 6 Governor Sundlun selected Francis Mur-
ray from the list of fifteen names originally sent from the Commis-
sion.5 7 Murray was subsequently confirmed. 58
3. Some Time For Reflection
Reactions to the judicial selections were mixed. Russell Gar-
land of the Providence Journal Bulletin reported that despite the
attempts to depoliticize the selection process, rumors were circu-
lating that the "fix was in for certain candidates."59 Some observ-
ers had concluded that the new process was a success, even though
it could not "suddenly end attempts to get preferred candidates on
the bench."60 Others expressed less equivocal support. Paul Kelly,
the Senate majority leader, told Garland that "[flor the first time
the process itself was wide open. A[ll] who thought they were qual-
ified.., could present their credentials to a commission." 61 Chair-
man Kelly of the Commission concluded that while "persons may
disagree on which nominee should have been appointed, [or] which
was the most qualified... I don't think you can argue that anyone
on the list of nominees we submitted was not qualified."62 How-
ever, Chairman Kelly expressed disappointment that few members
of the public attended commission meetings.
55. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-6(c) (Supp. 1994).
56. Letter from Michael Kelly, Chairman, Judicial Nominating Commission,
to Honorable Bruce Sundlun (Sept. 16, 1994).
57. Sundlun Proposes Francis J. Murray for Family Court, Prov. J. Bull.,
Sept. 22, 1994, at D15.
58. The Senate never acted on George Salem's nomination to the workers'
compensation court because his nomination was contingent on Judge Rotondi's
move to family court. See supra pp. 92-93.
59. A New Process of Nominating Judges Tested, supra note 27, at A3.
60. Id. (quoting Philip West, Executive Director of Common Cause of Rhode
Island). Governor Sundlun acknowledged that he was lobbied extensively on be-
half of various nominees put forward by the Nominating Commission. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Observers also disagreed on the significance of the demise of
Judge Rotondi's nomination. While Governor Sundlun expressed
displeasure with Rotondi's treatment by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, he acknowledged that the Senate had the "right to re-
ject the Rotondi nomination if they chose to do so."63 Not surpris-
ingly, Senate Majority Leader Kelly agreed that the Senate had
acted properly. "Two groups of evaluators looked at the same nom-
inee in two different ways," he said, "that in no way mars the pro-
cess."6 4 Garland opined:
In the end, the clash over Rotondi probably was less a com-
ment on the new judicial selection process than an example of
what happens when a politically weakened governor tries to
push his candidate through a reluctant Senate. Two days
before the Judiciary Committee rejected Rotondi, Sundlun
was soundly defeated in the Democratic primary.6 5
For some observers the Rotondi incident raised several serious
concerns about the commission's operation. Susan Epstein's letter
to the Commission opposing Judge Rotondi was made public dur-
ing the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, even though she
had been promised by the Commission that the letter would be
kept confidential. Majority Leader Kelly also expressed concern
that the Commission had determined it did not have the power to
conduct hearings or subpoena witnesses when screening appli-
cants. He did not "see how the commission c[ould] thoroughly
screen candidates unless it interview[ed] witnesses, such as
Rotondi's ex-wife." 66
The Commission engaged in some self-reflection. Based on its
first round of experiences, the Commission proposed and thereafter
adopted permanent changes to its rules. 67 Under these new rules:
1) The Commission must conduct applicant "[i]nterviews . . . in
open session" except that "portions of an interview in which confi-
63. Id. Governor Sundlun explained that he nominated Rotondi because he
had helped to engineer changes in the workers' compensation law that were widely
praised for saving the system. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Proposing permanent rules triggered the twenty day public notice and
comment period of the Administrative Procedures Act. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-
3(a)(1), (1993 Reenactment), amended by 1995 R.I. Pub. L. Ch. 300, § 1. The
amended version of the statute provides for a 30 day period. Id.
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dential information would be discussed may be held in closed ses-
sion at the discretion of the Commission or at the request of the
interviewee;" 68 2) The Commission must hold a public meeting
prior to any final vote to receive comments from the public concern-
ing the applicants interviewed by the commission; 69 3) The Com-
mission must conduct its public vote by following a "successive
majority" system endorsed by the American Judicature Society.70
It adopted several other changes as well. 71
68. Uniform Rules for the Judicial Nominating Commission, § III, p.2. The
Commission announced informally that it would extend the length of interviews
from fifteen to thirty minutes.
69. Id. "Following public notice, oral comments shall be entertained at a pub-
lic hearing held prior to the Commission's vote to fill a judicial position. Public
comments shall be considered by the Commission in its review and deliberation as
to the qualification of candidates." Id.
70. Under that system,
1) The number of votes allotted to each member of the Commission shall
equal the number of names required to be submitted to the Governor to
fill judicial vacancies.
2) Each member of the Commission shall cast one vote per applicant.
3) Commission members cast one allotted vote for an applicant with vot-
ing repeated until the necessary number of names remain.
On the first round, Commissioners vote on the entire list of applicants.
Each applicant must receive at least one less than a majority vote to re-
main under consideration during this initial round. (Example: With a
nine member Commission, each applicant must receive four votes).
If too many applicants remain under consideration after the first
round of voting is completed, this voting procedure is repeated with the
remaining applicants. To remain under consideration, each applicant
must receive a majority of the Commission's votes. (Example: With a nine
member Commission, each applicant must receive five votes).
It may be necessary to repeat the procedure until the prescribed
number of candidates has been selected. Each applicant would be re-
quired to receive a majority of votes to remain under consideration. How-
ever, the number of votes allowed each Commissioner would be reduced
by one.
Uniform Rules of Judicial Nominating Commission, § V, p. 3-4 (Nov. 30, 1994).
71. In its advertisements announcing a judicial vacancy, the Commission
must "encourage racial, ethnic and gender diversity within the judiciary" and pub-
lish the advertisements "for a reasonable period of time to afford notice to prospec-
tive applicants and in consideration of deadlines imposed by the enabling statute."
Id. § I, p. 1 (Nov. 30, 1994). The Commission must publish each notice of vacancy
in at least the twelve publications it had used for previous vacancies. Id. app. B.
The Commission must acknowledge receipt of each application for a judicial va-
cancy. Id. § I, p.1.
The Commission amended the applicant questionnaire to require practicing
attorneys to provide the names of not more than ten attorneys who have been op-
posing counsel within the preceding twelve months whom the Commission could
contact to comment upon the applicant's ability to fill a judicial position. For the
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C. On to the Supreme Court: The Chief Justice Vacancy
On November 8, 1994, by a margin of seventy to thirty per-
cent, Rhode Island's voters approved the constitutional amend-
ment applying the new selection process to supreme court
vacancies. 72 Thereafter, Governor Sundlun formally notified the
Commission of a vacancy for the chief justice of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court. The vacancy had existed since Chief Justice Fay's
resignation in September 1993. The Commission followed its new
rules and regulations to create a list of nominees for that
vacancy. 73
The Commission selected five of the nine applicants for inter-
views: Justice Joseph Weisberger, the acting chief justice; Supe-
rior Court Judge Richard Israel; Ira Schreiber, whom the
Commission had previously nominated for a family court position;
federal administrative law Judge Donald Ryan, and Kent Willever,
whom the Commission had previously nominated for a superior
court opening.74
In describing the subsequent interviews, the Providence Jour-
nal Bulletin reported that "[h]istory was made.., in a tiny hearing
room as five men publicly told a panel of lawyers and lay people
why they want to be Rhode Island's top judge, a post traditionally
handed to the person with the most juice in the General Assem-
bly."75 About a half-dozen spectators attended the half-hour inter-
views in which the candidates reviewed their qualifications with
commissioners and answered questions about judicial philosophy
and court administration.76
same purpose, sitting judges were asked to provide the names of not more than ten
attorneys who have appeared before them in the past six months. Id. app. A, p.12,
ques. 39(b),(c).
Finally, the Commission made explicit that only those applicants who were
interviewed could be considered for recommendation to the governor. Id. § V, p.3
("[Tihe Commission shall select no less than three nor more than five highly quali-
fied persons to fill each judicial vacancy from the list of those persons interviewed
who meet . . . legal requirements for the judicial office.") (emphasis added).
72. Voters Reform Judiciary, Trim Legislature Size: A Proposed Amendment
for a Constitutional Convention is Defeated, Prov. J. Bull., Nov. 9, 1994, at A9.
73. Russell Garland, Selection Process for Chief Justice is Underway, Prov. J.
Bull., Dec. 20, 1994, at D13.
74. Russell Garland, Hopefuls for Bench Assigned Interview by Panel, Prov. J.
Bull., Jan. 20, 1995, at B4.
75. Russell Garland, New Order in the Court, Prov. J. Bull., Jan. 28, 1995, at
Al.
76. Id.
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Before its vote on the five candidates interviewed, the Com-
mission confronted an ethics code dilemma. Each of the five law-
yer members were representing clients before Justice Weisberger
and the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Although the commission-
ers expressed confidence that they would be impartial, they sought
an advisory opinion from the Ethics Commission. 77
The Ethics Commission concluded that the lawyers could act
on Justice Weisberger's application without violating the Ethics
Code. 78 It reasoned that Justice Weisberger had the freedom to re-
cuse himself from hearing any matters in which the lawyers ap-
peared as advocates. Futhermore, the Ethics Commission
emphasized that the commissioners simply made recommenda-
tions to the governor. "Once the lawyer-members of the Commis-
sion make their recommendations to the Governor," the Ethics
Commission wrote, "they no longer have any . . . authority over
whichever applicant is ultimately appointed."79
Thereafter, the Nominating Commission held its first public
hearing to consider comments on the five applicants. Most of the
eight witnesses testified in support of one of the five. However, a
few spoke against Justice Weisberger because of his age, 74, and
because he was on the court while former Chief Justice Fay and
court administrator Matthew Smith managed a secret spending
account. At the end of the hearing the Commission deliberated. In
public session, it then followed its new voting procedure to recom-
mend Justice Weisberger, Judge Israel and Kent Willever to Gov-
ernor Almond, who had taken office one month earlier.80
As expected, Governor Almond selected Justice Weisberger.
During confirmation hearings members of the House and Senate
questioned Justice Weisberger and other witnesses about Weis-
77. Letter from William Poore, Counsel to the Judicial Nominating Commis-
sion, to Martin Healey, Rhode Island Ethics Commission (Jan. 26, 1995).
78. Panel Sees No Conflict for Lawyers Recommending a New Chief Justice.,
Prov. J. Bull., Feb. 3, 1995, at A5.
79. Advisory Opinion No. 95-10, Rhode Island Ethics Commission (Apr. 5,
1995).
80. Russell Garland, Weisberger, Israel, Willever Nominated, Prov. J. Bull.,
Feb. 7, 1995, at D5. Justice Weisberger received seven votes with two abstentions.
Judge Israel received eight votes with one abstention. Kent Willever received nine
votes. Ira Schreiber received three votes, and administrative law Judge Donald
Ryan received one. Telephone Interview with Kathleen A. Sousa, Legal Assistant,
Judicial Nominating Commission (Feb. 22, 1996).
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berger's age and the secret court account.81 Weisberger was ap-
proved unanimously in both chambers.8 2 His swearing in as Chief
Justice set off "intense competition for the open seat on the five-
member court."83
D. The First Associate Justice Vacancy
The Nominating Commission received twenty-nine applica-
tions for the associate justice position. It selected twelve appli-
cants to interview.8 4  When asked why no women were
interviewed, Chairman Michael Kelly responded that only two
applied and neither was deemed qualified by the Commission.
Kelly said that no blacks or Hispanics applied.8 5 Commissioners
asked applicants interviewed about a wide range of topics, includ-
81. Russell Garland, Legislature Must Approve Weisberger, Prov. J. Bull., Feb.
11, 1995, at A3. Weisberger said he was unaware of improprieties in the court
account until an investigation uncovered them. Id. While an associate justice, he
received $3,369 from the secret fund to reimburse him for attending three confer-
ences. Reimbursement for those expenses would have been proper from the appro-
priate account. Id.
However, auditors also found that Weisberger was reimbursed for an im-
proper expenditure of $126.54 for a party for the cast and crew of an educational
video Weisberger organized to commemorate the bicentennial of the United States
Constitution. Weisberger testified that when he determined the reimbursement
was improper he repaid the court for the cost of the reception. Id.; see also Russell
Garland, House Panel Grills Top Judge Nominee, Prov. J. Bull., Feb. 18, 1995, at
A5; Russell Garland, Weisberger Undergoes 3rd Hearing, Prov. J. Bull., March 8,
1995, at B4.
82. Russell Garland, Justice Weisberger Confirmed, Prov. J. Bull., March 15,
1995, at Al.
83. Russell Garland, Justice Weisberger is Sworn in as Chief of R.I. Supreme
Court, Prov. J. Bull., Mar. 21, 1995, at B4. Many lawyers who applied for the
associate justice position created when Justice Weisberger became chief justice
had not applied for the chief justice vacancy out of deference to Weisberger. Rus-
sell Garland, Weisberger Appointed High Court's Chief Justice, Prov. J. Bull., Feb.
10, 1995, at Al.
84. The Commission chose to interview Superior Court Judges John Bourcier
and Richard Israel, U.S. Magistrate Robert Lovegreen, and lawyers Kent Willever,
Ronald DelSesto, William Dimitri Jr., Lauren Jones, Peter Lawson Kennedy, John
MacFadyen, William Robinson III, and Ira Schreiber. Russell Garland, 11 in the
Running for R.I. Supreme Court, Prov. J. Bull., Mar. 24, 1995, at C4. Assistant
United States Attorney Everett Sammartino was a last-minute addition. Russell
Garland, Judicial Panel to Trim Field, Prov. J. Bull., Apr. 10, 1995, at Al. Judge
Israel, Kent Willever, and Ira Schreiber were given the option to waive their inter-
views because the Commission had interviewed them only two months before for
the chiefjustice vacancy. All three chose not to be interviewed again. Russell Gar-
land, Judicial Commission Begins Interviewing, Prov. J. Bull., April 1, 1995, at A4.
85. Judicial Panel to Trim Field, supra note 84, at A6.
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ing the death penalty, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's case
management practices, and the O.J. Simpson trial. All were asked
why they wanted to serve on the high court.8 6
Thirty-one witnesses asked to testify at the Commission's pub-
lic hearing on the applicants.8 7 Virtually all the witnesses testified
in support of a particular candidate rather than in opposition to a
candidate. Sixteen testified in support of Superior Court Judge
John Bourcier. While most of the other witnesses testified in sup-
port of other candidates, Leslie Lopes, who testified for a minority
judicial task force, turned to tell Judge Bourcier, who was present
during her testimony, that she did not like what went on in his
courtroom.
88
The Commission thereafter voted to nominate Judge Bourcier,
William Dimitri, Lauren Jones, and John MacFadyen. 89 Governor
Almond ultimately selected Judge Bourcier from the list,90 re-
marking that, "Judge Bourcier has a long and very distinguished
career as an associate justice of the Superior Court and has won
the respect and praise of his colleagues and the public during the
86. Id.
87. Russell Garland, Witnesses Weigh In for Judge Bourcier, Prov. J. Bull.,
Apr. 11, 1995, at C5.
88. Id.
89. Russell Garland, 4 Nominated for High Court, Prov. J. Bull., Apr. 14,
1995, at Al. The Commission had to vote twice to narrow the field to the three to
five required. In the first round,
Dimitri and MacFadyen received nine votes, Jones eight, Willever seven,
Bourcier six, Lovegreen five and Israel one. Candidates who failed to get
five votes were eliminated. The panel voted again, this time with each
member allowed to vote for only four candidates. The second tally was
Dimitri and MacFadyen nine, Jones eight, Bourcier seven, Willever two,
and Lovegreen one.
Id. at A4.
90. Governor Almond delayed his choice beyond the ten days permitted by the
statute. His legal counsel, Joseph Larisa Jr., reportedly told the press that "Al-
mond has no qualms about ignoring the timetable of the law," because "the public
wants a considered decision, not a hasty one." Almond May Delay Choice Until
Next Week, Prov. J. Bull., Apr. 20, 1995, at A10. Before Governor Almond chose
Judge Bourcier, the Providence Journal Bulletin wrote an editorial supporting the
judge. While each of the four nominees was qualified to be on the supreme court, it
wrote, Judge Bourcier matched the other candidates' skill and experience and
"earned" a place on the supreme court with two decades of exemplary service on
the superior court that deserved "to be acknowledged and rewarded." Bourcier for
Justice .. , Prov. J. Bull., Apr. 21, 1995, at A16.
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years he has served on the bench."91 Judge Bourcier encountered
almost no opposition in the judiciary committees of the House and
Senate, 92 and he was subsequently confirmed in both chambers. 93
E. Reactions to Judge Bourcier's Selection
The process that resulted in Judge Bourcier's elevation to the
supreme court received mixed reviews. Governor Almond ex-
pressed dissatisfaction, but to avoid detracting from Bourcier's se-
lection he originally declined to offer specific criticisms. He
emphasized that he had and would "always support merit selec-
tion."94 Critics complained that Judge Israel was on the list to fill
the chief justice vacancy but did not appear on the list to fill the
subsequent associate justice vacancy.95 Governor Almond was re-
portedly "upset that the commission did not include Superior
Court Judge Richard Israel on the list."96 The Governor subse-
quently complained in public that the Commission gave him a list
of only four names to fill the vacancy.97
Charles Bakst of the Providence Journal Bulletin saw in
Bourcier's selection cause for optimism. He wrote that "those who
welcome the selection of Bourcier can take satisfaction in knowing
91. Russell Garland, Bourcier Named to High Court, Prov. J. Bull., Apr. 29,
1995, at Al.
92. The vote was 13-1 in both committees. In the Senate Judiciary Committee
Senator William Fitzpatrick registered the lone vote against Bourcier because of a
demeaning comment Fitzpatrick said Bourcier had made several years before
about a criminal defendant with AIDS. State House Journal, Prov. J. Bull., May
12, 1995, at C7. Representative Harold Metts registered the only vote against
Bourcier on the House Judiciary Committee, citing Bourcier's "conservative views,
his stance on the death penalty, and his stringent criminal sentences." Scott Mac-
Kay, House Panel Approves Bourcier, Prov. J. Bull., May 6, 1995, at A4.
93. Scott MacKay, Bourcier Confirmed for High Court, Prov. J. Bull., May 19,
1995, at B5.
94. Bourcier Named to High Court, supra note 91, at Al.
95. Jim Baron, Almond's Choice Wasn't Nominated, Pawtucket Evening
Times, May 9, 1995, at A6 (theorizing that the Commission was controlled by leg-
islative leaders who forced a Republican governor to select the Democratic
Bourcier by including clearly less qualified candidates on the list who were there
simply to "round out the field"). Scott MacKay, Justice Shea to Retire, Prov. J.
Bull., May 27, 1995, at Al, at A5.
96. Justice Shea to Retire, supra note 95.
97. Id. at Al (reporting that Governor Almond was upset that the Commission
sent him only four names for the vacancy filled by Judge Bourcier); Bourcier Con-
firmed for High Court, supra note 93, at B5 (reporting that the governor planned
to speak to the leaders in the General Assembly and perhaps introduce legislation
to require the commission to provide five names to fill each vacancy).
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that a Republican governor, handed four names by a screening
panel that is at the heart of the new procedure, picked a Demo-
crat."98 The new process was a dramatic departure from the past,
according to Bakst because Bourcier
got nowhere in 1993 when he sought a high court seat under
the old system for selecting members of that tribunal: election
by the General Assembly, with no role by an outside screen-
ing panel or the governor. That Supreme Court seat went to
Victoria Lederberg, a former legislator who was backed by
House Speaker John Harwood....
Bourcier... said... that perhaps he had been naive, but
he had thought the Assembly election would be an "open pro-
cess." He had the Bar Association's top rating and media
backing.
But, in the old system, the House speaker was the key.
Besides that, Bourcier says, "I'd never been in the General
Assembly, so I couldn't go to anyone and say, 'Vote for me,
you remember me.' Secondly, I'm on the bench. I can't go to
lawyers who are in the General Assembly and say to them, 'I
wish you'd vote for me.' 99
Bakst, however, was willing to speculate about possible polit-
ical maneuvering in the future. He predicted that William Dimitri,
a "GOP warhorse who worked for Almond in the office of U.S. at-
torney" would yet surface on the bench in the superior court seat
that Bourcier vacated. 100
F. Another Supreme Court Vacancy
Justice Donald Shea announced his retirement less than one
week after Justice Bourcier took his place on the supreme court. 101
98. M. Charles Bakst, New Selection Process the Charm for Bourcier, Prov. J.
Bull., May 7, 1995, at D1.
99. Id. at D2.
100. Id. at D1. Bakst was wrong. See infra pp. 116-17 (describing nomination
of Frank Williams to superior court).
101. Justice Shea to Retire, supra note 95, at A5. Moreover, Judge Bourcier's
elevation created a vacancy on the superior court, and superior court Judge Paul
Pederzani Jr. notified Governor Almond of his retirement. Tracy Breton, Judge
Pederzani, 69, Announces Retirement, Prov. J. Bull., May 19, 1995, at B5. How-
ever, due to budget cuts the superior court vacancy created by Judge Pederzani's
retirement may not be filled anytime soon. Russell Garland, John Mulligan, &
Scott MacKay, Political Scene, Prov. J. Bull., June 19, 1995, at B3. For a discus-
sion of the process that resulted in the nomination and confirmation of Frank Wil-
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The Commission began its work to fill that vacancy in July,
1995.102
From among twenty-eight applicants the Commission selected
thirteen for interviews. This time the list included two women.10 3
The Commission had recently interviewed several of the thirteen
for the position filled by Justice Bourcier. However, because the
Commission had recently added two new members, 10 4 it decided to
interview all thirteen.
The Commission simultaneously addressed concerns ex-
pressed by some that the voting procedure should be changed to try
to assure that where five or more candidates have the support of a
majority of the commissioners, the governor receives a list of five
names to fill the vacancy. The Commission adopted changes on an
interim basis 10 5 to increase the likelihood that five names would
appear on each list provided to fill a judicial vacancy.106
hams to fill the superior court vacancy created by Justice Bourcier's elevation see
infra pp. 113-15.
102. Scott MacKay, 28 Lawyers, Judges, Seek Seat on R.I. Supreme Court,
Prov. J. Bull., July 22, 1995, at A10.
103. The Commission chose to interview Judges Mark Pfeiffer and Richard
Israel of the superior court, William Dimitri, Jr., Kent Willever, Barbara Hurst,
Margaret Curran, Peter Lawson Kennedy, William Robinson III, Everett Sammar-
tino, Robert Flanders, John MacFadyen, Lauren Jones, and U.S. Magistrate Judge
Robert Lovegreen. Scott MacKay, List of Applicants for Supreme Court Pared to
13 Names, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 10, 1995, at B1, B4.
104. See supra note 17.
105. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-3(b) (Supp. 1995).
106. Under the new procedure:
1) Each Commissioner shall have up to five affirmative votes and shall
only be allowed to cast one vote per applicant/interviewee.
2) Initially, the Commissioners shall vote on all applicants who have been
interviewed. The voting is completed after the first round when three,
four, or five candidates receive at least five votes and no other candidates
receive at least four votes.
3) If more than five applicant/interviewees receive a total of five or more
votes in the first round, a second round shall be required only on those
applicant/interviewees receiving five or more votes. Each Commissioner
shall be allotted a total of five affirmative votes in any second round of
voting.
4) If after the second round vote more than five applicant/interviewees
receive five or more votes, then those five applicant/interviewees with the
most votes among such applicant/interviewees will be the nominees sub-
mitted to the Governor.
In the event of a tie for one or more positions, a run-off vote shall be con-
ducted between or among those tied for the remaining positions. Each
Commissioner shall be allotted the same number of votes as there are po-
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In addition, Alan Flink, a new commissioner, sought an advi-
sory opinion from the Ethics Commission on the propriety of a com-
missioner participating in voting on an applicant who is one of the
commissioner's law partners. The Commission advised Flink that
members of the Judicial Nominating Commission could not "par-
ticipate and vote on matters concerning judicial applicants to
whom they are associated as partners and/or associates employed
by the same firm or as business associates." 07 The Ethics Com-
mission reasoned that
A public official's participation in matters involving a "busi-
ness associate" would violate Code provisions which prohibit
a public official from participating in matters when said pub-
lic official has an interest, in this case based on the relation-
ship of "business associate," which is in substantial conflict
with the proper discharge of his or her duties in the public
interest.108
After interviews and a public hearing the Commission nomi-
nated William Dimitri, Lauren Jones, John MacFadyen, Mark
Pfeiffer, and Kent Willever for the vacancy. 10 9 The change in the
voting procedure was responsible for creating the list of five names
for the governor. 110
sitions to fill in such run-off vote and the applicant/interviewee(s) with the
most votes shall be the remaining nominee(s).
5) A second round of voting is required if after the first round, there are
three, four or five applicant/interviewees with five or more votes and one
or more with four votes.
In the second round of voting, only those applicant/interviewees who re-
ceived at least four votes in the first round would be included. The voting
is completed after the second round when three, four, or five applicant/
interviewees receive at least five votes.
Rules of Judicial Nominating Commission, supra note 70, § V. (Proposed Official
Draft, Oct. 1995).
107. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, Advisory Opinion No. 95-67, (Aug. 16,
1995).
108. Id. at 4. Thus, Flink thereafter recused himself from consideration of Wil-
liam Robinson III, one of his partners at Edwards & Angell.
109. Nominating Commission Chooses 5 Finalists for R.L 's High Court, Prov. J.
Bull., Aug. 31, 1995, at B1.
110. In the first round of voting, Lauren Jones received nine votes, John
MacFadyen received eight votes, William Dimitri received six votes, Judge Pfeiffer
received five votes, with one abstention, Kent Willever received four votes, Robert
Flanders received three votes, Judge Israel received three votes, with two absten-
tions, U.S. Magistrate Judge Lovegreen received two votes, and Barbara Hurst
received one vote. Under the new voting procedure, Kent Willever joined Dimitri,
Jones, MacFadyen, and Pfeiffer in a second round. Under the old rule the voting
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The Governor selected Judge Pfeiffer.11' Almost immediately
questions were raised about the nomination because of reports
that Judge Pfeiffer should have done more in his capacity as direc-
tor of the Department of Business Regulation from 1986 to 1988 to
pursue warnings of financial problems at some privately insured
banks and credit unions.112 Governor Almond responded that he
had concluded Judge Pfeiffer was not to blame for the crisis caused
by the subsequent failure of institutions insured by the Rhode Is-
land Share and Deposit Indemnity Corporation.1 13 Judge Pfeiffer
was also criticized because as director he approved the sale of an
insurance company to two businessmen, one of whom had filed a
corporate bankruptcy, a personal bankruptcy and been convicted of
illegal electronic surveillance of a business rival. That man alleg-
edly participated in looting the insurance company as part of the
biggest theft in Rhode Island history.1 14
G. Judge Pfeiffer's Withdrawal, The 'New List' Controversy, and
The Selection of Robert Flanders
On the eve of his Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, in the
face of expected legislative opposition based on his role in the state
banking crisis, Judge Pfeiffer withdrew his nomination. 115 Gover-
nor Almond asked the Commission for at least one new name to go
would have been completed and the list would not have included Willever's name.
In the second round Dimitri received six votes, Jones received nine votes,
MacFadyen received nine votes, and Judge Pfeiffer and Kent Willever each re-
ceived seven votes. Id.
111. Russell Garland & Gregory Smith, Governor Selects Pfeiffer for High
Court, Prov. J. Bull., Sept. 23, 1995, at Al.
112. Id. (discussing report of Rhode Island Share Deposit and Indemnity Cor-
poration (RISDIC) Commission).
113. Tracy Breton et al., Pfeiffer Withdraws Candidacy, Prov. J. Bull., Oct. 12,
1995, at Al; Governor Selects Pfeiffer, supra note 110, at Al.
114. Governor Selects Pfeiffer for High Court, supra note 111 at Al.
115. Pfeiffer Withdraws Candidacy, supra note 113, at Al. In his letter inform-
ing Governor Almond, Pfeiffer wrote that "it has become apparent within the last
few days that if I obtain the necessary votes for confirmation by the Senate, it will
arise in the context of a divisive political debate." Id. Senate Majority Leader Paul
Kelly and Judiciary Committee Chair Domenic DiSandro had met with Pfeiffer
and informed him that his nomination "had the potential to reopen the wounds of
the banking crisis" and that he "should be prepared for opposition from depositors
who had their money frozen in the 1991 collapse of the institutions insured by the
Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity Corp." Id. Majority Leader Kelly later
commented on Pfeiffer's withdrawal by saying that "[t]o turn around and say the
Senate was going to reject him, I don't know how he could draw that conclusion.
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with the remaining four on the list formerly forwarded to him. Jo-
seph Larisa, his legal counsel, explained that the governor was
"entitled to a full list of five names" because there were highly
qualified candidates who were not originally chosen by the Com-
mission. 116 He mentioned Judge Israel as an example, and Gover-
nor Almond himself volunteered that he considered "U.S.
Magistrate Judge Robert Lovegreen and Assistant U.S. Attorney
Margaret Curran highly qualified for the Supreme Court." 1 7
While the Commission sought advice of its counsel,"18 Com-
mon Cause of Rhode Island publicly urged Governor Almond to se-
lect a nominee from the existing list of four names. Common
Cause acknowledged that the statute was silent on the question of
how to proceed in the event a nominated candidate withdrew.
Nevertheless, according to Common Cause, the Governor's demand
for a new list of five names or one name to round out the list of four
had no statutory support. Common Cause reminded the Governor
that the statute gives the Commission discretion to send the gover-
nor a list of "three to five names" for each vacancy. Five names are
never required. The Governor's insistence on new names was even
more damaging to the new selection process, Common Cause
warned, because the Governor was publicly suggesting individuals
whose names he wanted to see on the new list." 9
The Senate hadn't even looked at him." Russell Garland, Almond Asks Court for
New List, Prov. J. Bull., Dec. 4, 1995, at Al.
Days after Pfeiffer withdrew his nomination, the Providence Journal Bulletin
reported that one of his ex-wives, Judith Crowell, had written to the Senate Judici-
ary Committee disclaiming allegations she had previously made in a signed affida-
vit that the judge "physically abused" her and "engaged in other conduct which had
caused [her] to be reasonably in fear of him." In the letter to the Committee Crow-
ell's lawyer asserted that Crowell did not dispute signing the affidavit, but "ha[d]
no specific recollection of actually having signed the papers" and "categorically
denie[d] having been abused by Pfeiffer." Tracy Breton, Pfeiffer's Ex-Wife With-
drew Allegations of Physical Abuse, Prov. J. Bull., Oct. 21, 1995, at A3.
116. Russell Garland, Almond Wants New List of Court Candidates, Prov. J.
Bull., Oct. 13, 1995, at B1.
117. Id. Governor Sundlun had interpreted the selection law differently. One
year before, when Workers' Compensation Court Judge John Rotondi withdrew his
nomination to the family court after the Senate Judiciary Committee voted against
him, Governor Sundlun had selected another name from the existing list. See
supra at pp. 95-96.
118. Russell Garland, Panel to Weigh Request for New List of State Supreme
Court Candidates, Prov. J. Bull., Oct. 17, 1995, at B5.
119. Russell Garland, Common Cause Chides Almond on Court Nominees List,
Prov. J. Bull., Oct. 20, 1995, at B1; Letter from Michael J. Yelnosky, Chair, Judi-
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Mr. Larisa responded that the Governor "strongly disagree[d]
pretty much in the entirety with the position of Common
Cause."120 He suggested several reasons that the governor was en-
titled to a new list of five nominees. First, if a nominee is rejected
by the legislature the statute provides that the governor shall re-
ceive a new list.121 Treating a withdrawal in the face of legislative
opposition in a different manner would, Larisa explained, give the
legislature the power to whittle a list down through inaction until
its favored nominee was selected.1 22 Second, Larisa reiterated
that there were other nominees who were highly qualified who did
not appear on the original list.123 He emphasized that Governor
Almond had not ruled out the possibility of nominating one of the
four nominees he originally passed over, and he defended Almond's
decision to specifically identify individuals he deemed highly quali-
fied to sit on the court. Larisa asserted that Governor Almond's
cial Reform Committee and H. Philip West Jr., Executive Director of Common
Cause of Rhode Island to Honorable Lincoln C. Almond (Oct. 18, 1995). In the
interest of full disclosure, please note that I drafted that letter.
The Newport Daily News also had advice for the Governor. It wrote that
notwithstanding the legal question involving the interpretation of the statute,
"there is little doubt that the four remaining candidates have excellent credentials,
though they may lack the political ties the governor might prefer. A fifth name is
not needed." Appointment to Court Must Be on Merit, Newport Daily News, Oct.
17, 1995, at A7. The Daily News urged Governor Almond to select Kent Willever
from that list.
Willever has never been involved in Rhode Island politics. He has
never been a legislator, a state department head, a political crony, a cam-
paign worker. His experience is legal and judicial. He was legal counsel
for the Naval War College and served as chief judge of the 13-member
U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, the Navy's
equivalent of the Supreme Court. Before the days of merit selection, his
name never would have been considered as a potential judge by any
governor.
But times have changed, and Rhode Islanders, fed up with insider
scandals (we assume the governor remembers the demise of former Chief
Justice Thomas Fay and the Matty Smith scandal), called for reform. The
appointment of Willever would demonstrate that reform is real.
Id.
120. Garland, supra note 118, at B1.
121. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-5(c) (Supp. 1994).
122. Letter from Joseph Larisa, Jr., Executive Counsel to Governor Lincoln Al-
mond, to Philip West Jr., Executive Director, Common Cause of Rhode Island (Oct
21, 1995).
123. Id.
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expression of his preferences did not interfere with the Commis-
sion's duties.124
The Commission's counsel ultimately concluded that the only
time the selection statute clearly required the Commission to cre-
ate a new list was if the governor's nominee was rejected in the
legislature. "Since the commission is a creature of statute," he
"suggest[ed] that the commission take no action."125 The commis-
sioners voted eight to one to refuse the Governor's request for a
new list, and they recommended that the Governor ask the
supreme court for an advisory opinion to resolve the matter.126
Governor Almond requested an advisory opinion from the supreme
court on November 1, 1995.127
On January 5, 1996, the supreme court ruled that the gover-
nor was entitled to a new list.128 The court declared that the new
selection process was intended to "reduce the role of the Legisla-
ture, to expand the role of the Governor, and to require that the
commission specify three to five candidates on the basis of
merit."129 The Court then proceeded to interpret the relevant stat-
utory provision with that purpose in mind. Section 8-16.1-5(c) pro-
vides that
Each nomination shall be forwarded forthwith to the senate
and to the house of representatives .... The senate and the
house of representatives shall . . . separately consider the
nomination, but if either house fails within thirty (30) days
after . . . submission to confirm said nominee, the governor
shall appoint some other person to fill said vacancy and shall
submit his or her appointment to the senate and to the house
of representatives .... If the nominee is rejected by either
house, the commission shall submit a new list of three (3) to
124. Id.
125. Russell Garland, Panel Denies Almond a New Judge List, Prov. J. Bull.
Oct. 25, 1995, at B1.
126. Id. The dissenter was Alan Flink, Governor Almond's lone appointment
to the Commission, who would have acceded to the Governor's request because
"[wihenever th[e] process is interrupted, the only way to ensure the genuineness of
that process is maintained is to start again." Id.
127. In re Request for Advisory Opinion from the Governor (Judicial Nominat-
ing Commission), Supreme Court Order 95-619-Mp (Nov. 14, 1995).
128. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 668 A.2d 1246 (R.I. 1996). The
court heard from Governor Almond in support of his request and from the Speaker
of the House in opposition. Russell Garland, Court Hears Arguments On Judge
Candidates List, Prov. J. Bull., Dec. 5, 1995, at B1.
129. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 668 A.2d at 1249.
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five (5) candidates to the governor .... Any new list may
include but need not be limited to the names of any candi-
dates who were previously submitted to the governor by the
commission but who were not forwarded to the senate and to
the house of representatives .... 130
The Court concluded that to preserve the intent of this provision it
must be read to "require a 'new list' from the commission in the
event that any person's nomination [1] is rejected by legislative
vote or [2] is not acted upon by the Legislature or [31 is withdrawn
in the face of legislative opposition." 13 1 Otherwise, the court wrote,
the legislature could "control the appointment process by acting on
a nomination only when the Governor nominates the candidate on
a given list who represents the preferred choice of the
legislature."13 2
The Court explicitly stated that the Commission could fulfill
its responsibility to provide the governor a new list "by submitting
.. three, four, or five names that may include none, some or all of
the names that have been submitted previously."133 It suggested
that the Commission could review its selections and "maximize the
opportunity to present candidates to the governor."13 4
On January 16, 1996, the Commission met to consider how to
provide the governor with the new list required. It voted to con-
sider the twelve remaining candidates who were interviewed for
the position rather than to reopen the process. After deliberating,
the Commission forwarded a list to Governor Almond that in-
cluded the four names originally sent to him to fill the vacancy -
Lauren Jones, William Dimitri, John MacFadyen, and Kent Wil-
lever - plus Robert Flanders, who, along with Judge Israel, was
the sixth highest vote-getter when the vacancy was previously fil-
led, with three votes. 13 5
130. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-5(c) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
131. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 668 A.2d at 1250.
132. Id. at 1250. The court's exclusive concern seemed to be the possibility that
the legislature might in this way assert undue control over the nominating pro-
cess. Thus, it concluded that the statute did not require a new list when a nominee
withdrew because of death of disability. In that case the governor would be re-
quired to select a different nominee from the same list, id. at 1247, even if only two
names remained on that list.
133. Id. at 1250.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 109. This time the voting went as follows. In the first
round, Lauren Jones received nine votes, William Dimitri and Kent Willever re-
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Governor Almond passed over the same four candidates he re-
jected when he nominated Judge Pfeiffer. He nominated Robert
Flanders. 136 At 46, Flanders, a Republican, would be the youngest
member of the court. 137 Flanders was unanimously recommended
by the House Judiciary Committee.138 M. Charles Bakst, who ap-
plauded the Flanders appointment, criticized that Committee for
failing to ask Flanders any questions about his service as assistant
legal counsel to former Governor DiPrete, who is now under a cor-
ruption indictment. Bakst also noted the Committee's failure to
ask Flanders about his role as legal counsel to the Solid Waste
Management Corporation, whose executive director was allegedly
terminated for resisting attempts by members of the corporation to
engage in patronage hiring. Bakst suggested that it was important
for the public to have any concerns about Flanders dismissed
before he took the bench.' 39 Members of the Judiciary Committee
explained that they did not question Flanders about those issues
because there was no evidence that he was involved in any miscon-
duct. 140 The Senate Judiciary Committee thereafter questioned
Flanders more closely about these matters.' 4 ' He was easily con-
firmed in both the House and Senate.' 42
ceived seven votes, Robert Flanders and John MacFadyen received six votes, Wil-
liam Robinson III received four votes, with one abstention, Judge Israel received
three votes, and U.S. Magistrate Lovegreen received two votes. All those with
fewer than four votes were eliminated.
In the second round Lauren Jones received nine votes, John MacFadyen re-
ceived eight votes, William Dimitri, Robert Flanders, and Kent Willever received
seven votes, and William Robinson Ill received four votes, with one abstention.
Robinson was eliminated. Russell Garland, New List of Finalists for Supreme
Court Received by Almond, Prov. J. Bull., Jan. 17, 1996, at B1.
136. Russell Garland, Almond Nominates Flanders for Seat on Supreme Court,
Prov J. Bull., Jan. 27, 1996, at Al.
137. Id. Flanders was a partner at the law firm of Flanders & Medeiros. Previ-
ously he was a member of the law firm of Edwards & Angell. He served on the
Barrington Town Council, was a part-time legal adviser to former governors Ed-
ward DiPrete and Bruce Sundlun, prosecuted Workers' Compensation Court Judge
Robert Arrigan before the Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, and has
been legal counsel to the Solid Waste Management Corporation. Id.
138. House Panel Favors Flanders, Prov. J. Bull., Feb. 14, 1996, at B4.
139. M. Charles Bakst, Flanders Set Out on Supreme Course, Prov. J. Bull.,
Feb. 11, 1996, at Dl.
140. Id.
141. Russell Garland, Flanders Wins Confirmation as a Justice, Prov. J. Bull.,
March 1, 1996, at Al, A8.
142. Id.
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II. THE FINAL SUPERIOR COURT VACANCY
After the Commission had created the list from which Judge
Pfeiffer was originally selected, it turned its attention to the supe-
rior court vacancy created by Judge Bourcier's elevation. 143 Ap-
proximately 130 applicants responded to the notice of vacancy.
The Commission selected thirty for interviews.144 After those in-
terviews the Commission held its public hearing. Because of the
large number of candidates, the Commission limited the testimony
at the hearing by permitting only one witness per candidate. The
large number of candidates also prompted another change to the
Commission's voting procedure. 145
143. The Commission had focused on the supreme court vacancy first, even
though the statute gives the Commission only forty-five days to fill a superior court
vacancy. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-6(a) (Supp. 1994). Chairman Kelly, noting Gov-
ernor Almond's willingness to ignore the statutory time limits in order to deliber-
ate thoroughly, felt comfortable doing the same. See supra note 90.
144. Russell Garland, 30 Make Candidate List, Prov. J. Bull., Oct. 5, 1995, at
B1. Those thirty were William Brody, Margaret Curran, Anthony DiGioia, Wil-
liam Dimitri, a prior commission nominee for supreme court, Richard Galli, Rich-
ard Gonella, a prior commission nominee for superior court, Roberto Gonzalez, a
Providence Housing Court Judge, District Court Judge Walter Gorman, a prior
commission nominee for superior court, Barbara Hurst, District Court Master Jo-
seph Ippolito, Peter Lawson Kennedy, Lynette Labinger, Sandra Lanni, a prior
commission nominee for superior court, Jeffrey Lanphear, James Leavey, Nicholas
Long, Kenneth Madden, a prior commission nominee for superior court, David
Martin, a prior commission nominee for superior court, Susan McGuirl, a prior
commission nominee for superior court, John McMahon, a prior commission nomi-
nee for family court, District Court Judge Patricia Moore, a prior commission nom-
inee for superior court, Workers' Compensation Court Judge Debra Olsson, Joseph
Roszkowski, a prior commission nominee for family court, James Ryan, Lidia
Sanchez, Mark Smith, Michael Stone, Stephen White, Kent Willever, a prior com-
mission nominee for the supreme and superior courts, and Frank Williams, a prior
commission nominee for superior court. Id. Roberto Gonzalez subsequently with-
drew, and Bennett Gallow was added. Russell Garland, Panel to Weigh Request for
New List of State Supreme Court Candidates, Prov. J. Bull., Oct. 17, 1995, at B5.
145. The Commission was concerned that the votes could be spread among too
many candidates to select three to five with at least five votes, the minimum
number required under the statute. The voting procedure was amended by in-
terim rule to address this possibility. The new rule provides that:
6) In the event there are more than ten applicants/interviewees who are
initially voted upon and after the initial vote less than five applicants/
interviewees receive a minimum of four votes, then the initial vote shall
be considored to be a preliminary vote for the purpose of choosing the ten
or more (in the case of a tie) applicants/interviewees who have the most
votes after such preliminary vote. Thereafter the procedure set forth [for
voting in all other instances] shall apply to all subsequent votes.
Uniform Rules, supra note 70, § V, 6.
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The Commission thereafter met for its public vote. At the time
of the vote, William Dimitri and Kent Willever were on the list to
fill the supreme court vacancy pending the supreme court's opinion
on whether Governor Almond was entitled to a new list after Judge
Pfeiffer's withdrawal. They were also being considered by the
Commission for this superior court vacancy. Some concerns were
expressed about the propriety of having candidates' names appear
simultaneously on lists for two vacancies. For example, if Willever
or Dimitri were on lists for both courts, the governor could name
one of them to the superior court, reduce the number of names re-
maining on the supreme court list, and reignite the "new list con-
troversy. " 1 4 6 Nevertheless, the Commission decided to conduct its
vote. 1
4 7
Neither Dimitri nor Willever was selected for the superior
court vacancy. Richard Gonella, Sandra Lanni, David Martin,
Frank Williams, and Kenneth Madden were the five nominees.
148
All five had previously been nominated by the Commission for su-
146. Russell Garland, Nominating Commission Lists 5 For Superior Court
Seat, Prov. J. Bull., Nov. 2, 1995, at B1. This scenario was not addressed by the
Supreme Court in its Advisory Opinion. See supra pp. 110-111.
147. Id.
148. Id. In the first round of votes, David Martin received eight votes, Sandra
Lanni received six votes, Richard Gonella received five votes, and Frank Williams
received five votes, with one abstention, William Dimitri, Kenneth Madden, and
James Ryan received four votes, Richard Galli and Kent Willever received two
votes, and Margaret Curran, Anthony DiGioia, District Court Judge Walter
Gorman, and Jeffrey Lanphear received one vote.
Thus, William Dimitri, Richard Gonella, Sandra Lanni, Kenneth Madden,
David Martin, James Ryan, and Frank Williams moved into a second round of
voting. In that round, Martin received nine votes, Gonella received seven votes,
Lanni received six votes, Williams received six votes, Madden and Ryan received
five votes, and Dimitri received four votes. Commissioner Peter McGinn voted for
Williams in the second round although he had abstained in the first. McGinn con-
cluded that there was no actual conflict presented by the fact that his law firm had
been counsel to the Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation,
which was chaired by Mr. Williams. McGinn's firm had obtained a one-year con-
tract through a public bid and the contract had been granted to another firm there-
after. In the first round McGinn's abstention had no impact on the result, but in
the second round, if he had again abstained, Williams would have been forced into
a run-off with Madden and Ryan. Thus, McGinn concluded that abstention under
those circumstances would have been "the equivalent of a negative vote." Id. at
B4.
After the second round, Dimitri was eliminated. Gonella, Lanni, Martin and
Williams were placed on the list to be sent to the governor. A final run-off vote
took place between Madden and Ryan. Madden became the fifth name on the list
when he received five votes, and Ryan received three. Id.
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION
perior court vacancies.1 49 The Governor selected Frank Williams
from that list.150 Williams won the unanimous support of both the
Senate Judiciary Committee and the full Senate. 151
III. SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
This detailed history of the work of the Nominating Commis-
sion hopefully provides context for my conclusion that the new ju-
dicial selection process represents a real step toward restoring
public confidence in the judiciary. In considering this conclusion, it
is important to remember how judges were previously selected in
Rhode Island. Grand Committee selection of supreme court jus-
tices and gubernatorial selection of lower court judges virtually as-
sured a major role for partisan politics. This selection regime
restricted the pool of candidates considered for judicial vacancies.
The leaders in the House and Senate and the governor were likely
to favor political allies. Talented and committed lawyers from the
"wrong" party or who shunned politics and emphasized their law
practices or other pursuits were overlooked. 152 There was reason
to conclude that the best possible candidates were not considered
or selected. The new selection process reduces the likelihood,
although it cannot eliminate it, that unqualified individuals will be
appointed to the bench for partisan political purposes. 153 It in-
creases the likelihood that the best candidates from all back-
grounds will be considered and selected for judicial vacancies.
Most significantly, the public can now actively participate in
and scrutinize the selection process. A highly visible selection pro-
149. Id. at Bi.
150. Scott MacKay, Almond Fills Slot on Superior Court, Prov. J. Bull., Nov.
11, 1995, at Al.
151. Stephen Heffner, Solicitor to Step Down to Assume Judgeship, Prov. J.
Bull., Nov. 29, 1995, at Cl; Russell Garland, Judiciary Panel Backs Williams,
Prov. J. Bull., Nov. 17, 1995, at B1. The only testimony offered against Williams
during his judiciary commitee hearings was from three residents of Hopkinton, a
community he once served as town solicitor. They criticized various actions he had
taken while representing the town that they believed showed that Williams was
"governed by avarice and hubris." Id. at B1.
152. See, e.g., supra pp. 105-106 (discussing Judge Bourcier's experience with
the Grand Committee).
153. See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and
Issues, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 4 (1994) (stating that "merit selection" is a prefera-
ble system to judicial elections for enhancing public confidence in the courts even
though it will not completely eliminate politics from judicial selection).
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cess is crucial to restoring public confidence in the judiciary. Re-
storing that public confidence is essential because our legal system
depends so heavily on voluntary compliance with judicial deci-
sions. The Judicial Nominating Commission's proceedings give
Rhode Islanders their first real opportunity to view the previously
secret judicial selection process.
A. The Composition of the Commission and the Role of Partisan
Politics
The composition of the Judicial Nominating Commission was
conceived to try to reduce the influence of partisan politics by bal-
ancing the power of 1) the two political parties, 2) the executive
and legislative branches, and 3) lawyers and non-lawyers. The
power to nominate members of the Commission is distributed
among the governor, the majority party in both houses, and the
minority party in both houses. At least four of the members of the
Commission must be lawyers, and at least four must be non-law-
yers. 154 The role of partisan politics in judicial selection may be
relieved because lawyer and non-lawyer members of the Commis-
sion nominated by the chief executive and both parties in the legis-
lative branch must work together to select the most highly
qualified nominees. 15 5 A specific statutory provision requiring
commissioners to act impartially, as suggested by Barton Jenks,
may further help to minimize political considerations in the nomi-
nating process.1 56
I also generally agree with Mr. Jenks that it may be more ap-
propriate for the chair of the Commission to be selected by the
other members of the Commission rather than the governor. 1 57
However, as a result of former Governor Sundlun's defeat soon af-
ter the Commission was formed, the current Chair, Michael Kelly,
was not named by Governor Almond. Thus, the governor has not
154. See supra p. 88 (descibing the composition of the Commission).
155. The Commission should seek to maintain this balance in all of its work.
Thus, it should use subcommittees to screen applications only where absolutely
necessary to complete its work on time. Where subcommittees are necessary, they
should replicate the composition of the Commission as a whole. For example,
when forming subcommittees the Commission should consider the number of law-
yers and non-lawyers and the number of appointees traceable directly to the gover-
nor and the various legislative leaders.
156. See Jenks, supra note 4 at 71.
157. Jenks, supra note 4 at 72; R.I. Gen Laws § 8-16.1-1(e) (Supp. 1994).
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"captured" the Chair, which I assume is Mr. Jenks's primary con-
cern. Kelly's term is due to expire just before the next gubernato-
rial election. Thus, in the future the chair may also have been
named by a different governor then the one in office at a particular
time. Moreover, there is no guarantee that an elected chair will
not be one of the governor's appointments. Nevertheless, election
of the chair by the other members may "depoliticize" the chair and
help the Commission function free of gubernatorial influence. 15 8
Jenks also asserts that the "denial of any voice to Rhode Is-
land's lawyers in choosing the nominating commissions' lawyer
members is a serious mistake."159 However, the issue is not quite
as simple as his unequivocal condemnation suggests. The Rhode
Island bar is quite involved in the new selection process because a
majority of the members of the Commission are members of that
bar. Jenks is correct that the legislature rejected proposals to give
the Rhode Island Bar Association the power to recommend lawyers
to the governor to fill seats on the Commission. However, it is not
clear that the presence of members selected by the bar association,
a group that admittedly has knowledge of the pool of qualified judi-
cial candidates in the state, would necessarily help selection focus
on merit and not partisan politics. 160
158. Mr. Jenks has also suggested that barring a commissioner from serving
more than one full term or the uncompleted term of the commissioner he or she
replaced is problematic because "it may be difficult for the appointing authorities
to find people of high quality who are willing to serve on the commission." See
Jenks, supra note 4 at 77; § 8-16.1-2(c). However, the prohibition on multiple
terms may prevent concentration of power in incumbent commissioners. Until
there is evidence to support Jenks's contention that it will be difficult to find quali-
fied commissioners, the prohibition should stand.
Jenks's suggestion that former commissioners should be barred for longer
than one year from appearing before the commission as judicial candidates is well
taken. See Jenks, supra note 4 at 75; § 8-16.1-2(c) ("no members shall be eligible
for appointment to a state judicial office during a period of time he or she is a
commission member and for a period of one year hereafter."). Unless that prohibi-
tion is extended to four years, absent recusals there could be commissioners pass-
ing on the nomination of a candidate with whom they served on the commission.
The one year prohibition seems to be based on Rhode Island's one year "revolving
door legislation" prohibiting former legislators from taking judicial office within
one year after leaving the legislature. R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-14-5(e)(4) (1990 &
Supp. 1995).
159. Jenks, supra note 4 at 70.
160. See Goldschmidt, supra note 152, at 536 (quoting Allan Ashman & James
J. Alfini, The Key to Merit Selection: The Nominating Process 71 (1974) ("a merit
plan 'can create its own brand of... both party and bar politics.' "); Bruce Sundlun,
Selection Law Works, Prov. J. Bull., March 13, 1995, at A15 (asserting that the
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Moreover, experience has shown that increasing the number of
lawyers on the Commission can be problematic in a state as small
as Rhode Island. On the one hand, trial lawyers may be the best
qualified to identify the attributes of a successful judge. However,
those same lawyers can have conflicts of interest that might impair
their work on the Commission. The conflict exists where commis-
sioners have to evaluate judges they are appearing before or will
likely appear before in the future. If the commissioners must re-
cuse to avoid the conflict, the judicial aspirant is less likely to gar-
ner the minimum five votes needed to be recommended to the
governor.161 Sitting judges, who due to their expertise may be well
suited for higher judicial office, may be handicapped by the pres-
ence of active litigators on the Commission.
To date, the Commission's informal practice is for lawyers to
recuse from considering a judge if the lawyer has a case pending
before that judge. This process seems consistent with R.I. Gen.
Laws section 36-14-5(a), which prohibits a public official from hav-
ing "any interest, financial or otherwise, direct or indirect . . .
which is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his or
her duties ... in the public interest."16 2 A lawyer member of the
Commission with a case before a judge has an interest (the finan-
cial or professional interest in assuring that the client will get a
fair hearing before that judge) that could be in substantial conflict
with the proper discharge of the duty to select highly qualified can-
didates to fill the judicial vacancy. Put simply, a lawyer member of
the Commission might conclude, in the exercise of independent
judgment, that the judge is not highly qualified. The public duty to
not vote for the judge would be in substantial conflict with that
lawyer's interest in a fair hearing before the judge. The problem
could arise even when the lawyer member of the Commission does
not have a case pending before a sitting judge applying to the Com-
Rhode Island Bar Association was not included as "a selector of commission mem-
bers because there was concern that it had largely become a special-interest group
controlled by personal political opinions of its presidents, and not the public
interest.").
161. See supra note 147 (explaining that according to one lawyer commissioner
an abstention is the same as a no vote). The Commission is currently attempting
to formulate rules for voting that will minimize the disadvantage to judges who are
applicants for vacancies on other courts who may not, because of conflicts of inter-
est, be considered by some members of the Commission. It has not yet formulated
a viable solution.
162. R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-14-5(a).
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mission. Lawyers may think twice before deciding not to support a
judge they may appear before in the future.
The Ethics Commission's reasoning in support of its conclu-
sion that the lawyer members of the Nominating Commission
could vote on Justice Weisberger's application even though they
had cases pending before him seems to ignore this genuine conflict.
The Ethics Commission reasoned simply that Justice Weisberger
could recuse himself when a lawyer member of the Nominating
Commission appeared as an advocate and that commissioners
merely "recommend" names to the governor. 163 Moreover, the Eth-
ics Commission did not apply this reasoning when it concluded
that a lawyer member of the Nominating Commission cannot par-
ticipate in considering a law partner's application for a judicial va-
cancy.164 The partner could also recuse if he or she was
subsequently named to the bench, and commissioners always vote
only to recommend names to the governor.
The conflict permitted by the Ethics Commission in the Weis-
berger matter is even more problematic when a trial judge is in-
volved because that judge may be the sole arbiter of the dispute
involving the lawyer member of the Nominating Commission.
These difficult ethical problems would only be exacerbated if more
active litigators were named to the Commission. One way to avoid
some of these problems would be for the appointing authorities to
nominate to the Commission retired attorneys or attorneys with-
out active litigation practices. 165
Finally, Mr. Jenks's focus on the decision not to give the bar
association the power to select commissioners ignores the fact that
nothing precludes the bar association from commenting to the
Commission, the governor, or the legislature on the relative merits
163. Advisory Opinion No. 95-10, Rhode Island Ethics Commission (Apr. 5,
1995).
164. Advisory Opinion No. 95-67, Rhode Island Ethics Commission (Aug. 16,
1995).
165. There may be other reasons the number of lawyer members of the Com-
mission should not be increased. "Non-lawyer commissioners ... often offer the
relatively clear eye of a concerned outsider, a perspective sometimes difficult for
attorneys to appreciate. [Iun addition ... non-lawyer commissioners can lend im-
portant credibility to a process that otherwise would be... perceived to be domi-
nated by insiders from the legal system." Enhancing Federal Judicial Selection,
73 Judicature 64 (Aug./Sept. 1988).
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of applicants. 166 The Commission conducts public hearings ex-
pressly for that purpose.
B. Expanding the Pool of Judicial Applicants
The new selection system is also an improvement because all
members of the bar are encouraged to and may apply for judge-
ships, and the Commission must consider all applicants. The Com-
mission must advertise all judicial vacancies before it takes any
other steps to fill them. In an attempt to reach all segments of the
state's population, the notice of vacancy appears in twelve different
publications. Some Commissions in other states actively en-
courage or require commissioners to recruit qualified applicants.
While that may be another way to try to find the best judicial can-
didates, commissioners must remain impartial if they recruit an
applicant, and all applicants must be subject to the same
scrutiny.167
The notice of vacancy published by Rhode Island's Commission
specifically encourages applications from qualified men and women
of all races and ethnic backgrounds. A judiciary that reflects the
ethnic and gender diversity of the state is important for public con-
fidence. 168 Although it may be too early to say anything definitive
about this issue, it certainly appears that "merit selection" is not
an obstacle to diversity. 169 Second, some studies suggest that it is
166. In fact, Justin Holden, the president of the bar association, testified in
support of Justice Weisberger during Weisberger's confirmation hearings in the
House. He testified that the Bar Association's House of Delegates agreed Weis-
berger was "the best possible candidate." Russell Garland, House Panel Grills Top
Judge Nominee, Prov. J. Bull., Feb. 18, 1995, at A5.
167. Goldschmidt, supra note 153, at 28.
168. See id. at 67-8 (explaining that because "nominating commissions are the
cornerstone of the merit plan, it is essential the citizens perceive the commissions
as reflecting the ethnic and gender diversity of the jurisdiction involved.").
Mr. Jenks's suggestion that the statute improperly contains an "affirmative
action" or "political correctness" provision certainly is belied by the outcome of the
selection process to date. See Jenks, supra note 4 at 74. Only one African-Ameri-
can and two women have been selected to fill judicial vacancies. The language he
objects to simply gives the Commission authority to "disqualify any candidate with
a demonstrated history of bias toward [historically disadvantaged classes]." R.I.
Gen. Law § 8-16.1-4(b) (Supp. 1994). This seems a wise directive to Commission-
ers. Moreover, the Commission has not viewed that language as mandatory. For
example, Judge Gilbert T. Rocha, who had opposed fair housing legislation as a
legislator, was not disqualified by the Commission, and he was named to the fam-
ily court. See supra note 48.
169. Goldschmidt, supra note 153 at 41.
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the selection method most likely to produce a diverse judiciary. In
one study, "the data revealed that of the five major methods ofjudi-
cial selection in the United States, the largest proportion of Afri-
can-Americans (32%) and women (35%) attained judicial office
through a merit plan."170
The early results of Rhode Island's new selection process are
not very encouraging in this regard. Only one African-American
was selected for a vacancy, and he was already a sitting judge. 1 71
Only two women were selected. 172 Public pressure, participation
and scrutiny may help. For the first associate justice vacancy on
the supreme court, no women were selected by the Commission for
interviews. A reporter publicly asked the Chair of the Commission
to explain why.' 73 Just two months later, when the Commission
screened applicants for a second associate justice position, it
selected two women for interviews. Moreover, interested groups
and individuals can nominate candidates to the Commission or try
to identify highly qualified women and minorities and encourage
them to apply.' 74 The appointing authorities should try to name
women and minority group members to the Commission.
In addition to considering applicants of all races and genders,
the Commission must consider applicants of all professional back-
grounds. Partisan political activity is no longer an admission
ticket. By contrast, in the past neither the governor nor the Grand
Committee had any obligation to consider all qualified candidates.
One person who would not likely have been considered under the
old selection regime is Kent Willever, whom the Commission nomi-
nated for vacancies on the superior and supreme courts. He is well
qualified, but he is a political outsider. 175
170. Id. at 67. However, Rhode Island's Grand Committee process resulted in
the selection of two women for positions on the five-member supreme court.
171. See supra p. 94 (discussing Judge Edward Clifton's elevation to Superior
Court).
172. See id. (discussing the selection of Netti Vogel for superior court and
Elaine Bucci for district court).
173. See supra p. 101.
174. See supra p. 102 (mentioning Leslie Lopes of Rhode Island's minority judi-
cial task force).
175. Appointment to Court Must Be On Merit, Newport Daily News, Oct. 17,
1995, at A7. Cf. M. Charles Bakst, New Selection Process the Charm for Bourcier,
Prov. J. Bull., May 7, 1995, at D1 (explaining that Judge Bourcier would not have
been selected by the House Speaker under the old system for selecting supreme
court justices).
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A fair response is that Kent Willever is not on the bench.
Neither governor selected him. In fact, several observers of the
process have noted that for the most part the judges actually se-
lected through this new process would likely have been selected in
the past.176 Even if that view is correct, 177 there is still cause for
optimism. First, the experience with similar selection systems in
other states shows "a high level of general satisfaction.., among
attorneys, trial and appellate judges and women state court
judges." 178 Moreover, it is undeniable that individuals have been
nominated by the Commission who would not have received con-
sideration in the past. That is a necessary first step to reform.
With increased public scrutiny and pressure, a governor could be
held accountable for picking only political allies from the Commis-
sion's lists,179 and the legislature could be held accountable for
wielding its confirming authority to serve partisan political
ends.18 0 Real improvement in the quality of the State's judiciary
will require all participants in the process to commit to selecting
judges based on merit and not partisan politics.
Finally, even if many of the same individuals are appointed
under the new selection process, there may nevertheless be bene-
fits. The public may have more confidence in the process. More-
over, judges selected under the new system will not be able to trace
their good fortune exclusively to the legislature or the governor, to
whom they might therefore feel an allegiance.
176. See, e.g., The Usual Suspects, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 11, 1994, at A14.
177. See Goldschmidt, supra note 153, at 2, 41, 44 (reviewing study examining
the education and decisions ofjudges selected in a "merit plan" and noting the lack
of "hard" evidence that "merit selection" plans result in the selection of better
judges).
178. Id. at 58 (noting need to collect opinion data from "the general citizenry").
179. Id. at 15 (noting that final appointments must be made by a governor who
is politically accountable).
180. Thus, the Providence Journal Bulletin's suggestion that the new process is
problematic because there is little accountability is incorrect. For example, Gover-
nor Almond might be asked to explain why he passed over Lauren Jones, John
MacFadyen, William Dimitri and Kent Willever three separate tirdes. The new
selection system may actually make the governor and the general assembly more
accountable then they were under the old selection regime. For example, it ap-
pears that no member of the General Assembly was voted out of office because of
Chief Justice Fay's selection.
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C. Public Oversight and Participation
The public's opportunity to observe and participate is another
important improvement in the selection process. The public can
comment on the applicants throughout the Commission's selection
process, either in writing or at the public hearing. The Commis-
sion's rules and regulations could go further and require the Com-
mission to actively solicit comments from members of the bar or
others who have information relevant to a particular applicant's
fitness for judicial appointment. The applicant questionnaire al-
ready requires applicants to name members of the bar with whom
they have professional contact, and the Commission could contact
those lawyers by mail or by telephone. However, if the Commis-
sion cannot assure those lawyers that their comments will be confi-
dential,18 1 those comments may not be sufficiently frank to be
helpful.
The public could observe and participate in the selection pro-
cess earlier if the Commission released the names of all those who
applied for a vacancy, and not just those it selected for interviews.
The Commission decided not to disclose the names of all applicants
to protect the reputations of lawyers not selected for interviews.
That practice may violate the Access to Public Records Act.18 2 Ac-
cording to Unofficial Opinion No. OM94-01 of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office,' 8 3 the names of all applicants are "public records" any
member of the public has the right to inspect or copy.1
8 4
Under the Access to Public Records Act, "all records main-
tained or kept on file by any public body.., shall be public records
and every person shall have the right to inspect and/or copy such
records ..... 185 Section 38-2-2(d) exempts certain records from the
181. The confirmation hearings involving Judge Rotondi suggest the legisla-
ture has the power to subpoena correspondence from a member of the public sent
to the Commission. See supra pp. 94-95, R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-5(d) (Supp. 1994);
§ 8-16.1-6(d) (giving judiciary committees "the power upon majority vote ... to
issue witness subpoenas, subpoenas duces tecum, and orders for the production of
books, accounts, papers, records and documents.").
182. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 38-2-1 to 38-2-13. The Open Meetings Law is irrelevant
to this question. It "governs only the public's right to be notified of and attend
meetings of public officials. Access to public information is governed by ... the
Access to Public Records Act." Department of Attorney General, Unofficial Opin-
ion No. OM94-01, at 2 (Jan. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Unofficial Opinion].
183. See Unofficial Opinion, supra note 182.
184. Id. at 2.
185. R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-3(a).
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access requirement. Section (d)(1) exempts "information in person-
nel files maintained to hire.., any employee of a public body; pro-
vided, however, with respect to employees, the name . . . shall be
public."18 6 The Attorney General's Office has interpreted this pro-
viso to mean that the names of individuals considered for employ-
ment by public bodies are "public records." It opined that "if the
[Westerly] Town [Council, in interviewing individuals for the posi-
tion of Town Manager] created and maintains a list of names of the
applicants under consideration, that list... may be subject to the
mandatory disclosure requirement."18 7
This result is not unmistakably mandated by the language of
the statute, but it is good policy. Without knowing who has ap-
plied to the Commission for interviews, the public cannot comment
on all applicants. Perhaps more importantly, the public has no
way of knowing and evaluating the criteria Commission members
are using to screen applicants. For example, without access to the
names of all applicants, the public cannot determine whether the
Commission is adhering to its statutory mandate to exercise "rea-
sonable efforts to encourage racial, ethnic, and gender diversity
within the judiciary of this state."188
Assuming that the Access to Public Records Act does not re-
quire the Commission to make the names of applicants for judicial
vacancies public, and the Commission continues to believe that re-
leasing those names will harm applicants not selected for inter-
views, there may still be some way to satisfactorily balance the
interests at stake. The Commission's application form could notify
applicants that their names will be made public unless they elect
to have the Commission keep the fact of their application confiden-
tial. This might assure the maximum amount of public comment
on all applicants while minimizing the risk that applicants will be
discouraged from applying for fear that their reputations will be
harmed if they are not selected for an interview. Applicants who
expect public support, might prefer the opportunity to have the
186. Id. § 38-2-2(d)(1) (emphasis added).
187. Unofficial Opinion, supra note 182.
188. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-4. For example, in assessing why no minority law-
yers were selected for interviews for the first Supreme Court associate justice va-
cancy, the public left to rely only on Chairman Kelly's remarks to a reporter that
"no blacks or Hispanics applied." Jucicial Panel to Trim Field, supra note 84, at
A6.
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public comment on their application without fear of damage that
may be caused if they are not selected for an interview.189
More importantly, to give the public some assurance that the
Commission is fulfilling its statutory mandate to encourage racial,
ethnic, and gender diversity in Rhode Island's judiciary, the stat-
ute could require the Commission to publish an annual report of
the race, ethnicity, and gender of the pool of applicants considered
by the Commission in the previous year.' 90 The Commission could
require this information anonymously from all applicants.
One of the most significant features of the new selection sys-
tem that increases public participation is the public interview.
Under the Commission's rules all candidate interviews take place
in public session, unless confidential matters must be discussed.
These interviews can give the public important insights into an ap-
plicant's character, personality, philosophy, and qualifications.
Mr. Jenks suggests that the Commission's work is too public.
He believes that public interviews are unwise because they "will
deter some well-qualified lawyers from becoming candidates for
judgeships." 191 However, "the public should have little confidence
in the judicial potential of any candidate who does not accept the
opportunity for public scrutiny of his or her qualifications." 192
Morever, Jenks's criticism ignores perhaps the greatest attribute
of the new selection process. It opens to the public a process that
was previously shrouded in secrecy.
It does not appear that the Open Meetings Law requires public
interviews. 9 3 Nevertheless, the Commission should continue to
189. Cf Scott MacKay, et al., Violet Considers Race, Chaffee's Nobel Case, Prov.
J. Bull., Oct. 16, 1995, at B1, B3 (reporting that Arlene Violet volunteered that she
did not make the Judicial Nominating Commission's first cut when she applied for
a superior court vacancy).
190. Connecticut's Judicial Nominating Commission is required by statute to
report to the legislature "the statistics regarding the race, gender, national origin,
religion and years of experience as members of the bar" of all candidates for judi-
cial office. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-44a (m) (Supp. 1995).
191. Jenks, supra note 4, at 77-78.
192. Judicial Panel Starts Off On Wrong Foot, Newport Daily News, July 19,
1994, at A7.
193. "All meetings of the commission shall be subject to the open meetings
law...." R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-2(e) (Supp. 1995). The Open Meetings Law, R.I.
Gen. Laws §§ 42-46-1 to 42-46-9, declares that "[i]t is essential to the maintenance
of a democratic society that public business be performed in an open and public
manner and that the citizens be advised of and aware of the performance of public
officials and the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public pol-
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conduct interviews in public because in most instances the public's
interest in hearing a candidate answer questions outweighs the
candidate's privacy interest. Moreover, "sunshine diminishes par-
tisan politics and enhances the possibility that the [Commission]
will bring neutral criteria to the debate."194 If Commission mem-
bers wish to explore sensitive matters in the interviews, as they
undoubtedly sometimes will, the Commission can go into closed
session for part of the interview. Although some matters may be
discussed in some interviews that should be shielded from public
view, that is not a legitimate reason for closing the entire inter-
view. If interviews are closed, speculation and suspicion will be
aroused encouraged.
The Providence Journal Bulletin has hinted that the commis-
sion process is suspect because commission deliberations about the
relative merits of the candidates are private.195 Mr. Jenks has ar-
gued that the Commission's decision to conduct its deliberations in
private sessions is "almost certainly [an] incorrect interpretation of
its authority."1 96 However, if applicant interviews may take place
in private consistent with the Open Meetings Law, 197 deliberations
about the relative merits of the "job performance, character, or
icy." Id. § 42-46-1. Its general requirement is simple: "Every meeting of all public
bodies shall be open to the public unless closed pursuant to [statutory exception]."
§ 42-46-3.
A majority of the members of the public body may vote to close a meeting to
discuss a matter that fits within one of the statutory exceptions. Id. § 42-46-4.
Section 42-46-5(a)(1) permits a public body to close a meeting for "discussions of
the job performance, character, or physical or mental health of a person or per-
sons." Id. § 42-46-5(a)(1).
In Unofficial Opinion No. 0M94-01, the Attorney General's Office concluded
that the Town Council of Westerly had the right under Section 42-46-5(a)(1) to
conduct interviews with Town Manager candidates in closed session because the
purpose of the interviews was to "discuss the job performance, character, or physi-
cal or mental health of the applicants." Unofficial Opinion, supra note 182 at 2.
However, the Open Meetings Law simply gives the Commission the discretion to
interview the applicants in closed session, it does not require it. R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 42-46-5(a). In fact, the statute assumes that public business should "be per-
formed in an open and public manner." Id. § 42-46-1.
194. Enhancing Federal Judicial Selection, 73 Judicature 64, 118 (Aug/Sept.
1989) (disagreeing with suggestion that, in order to "depoliticize" the process, fed-
eral court nominees should not appear before the senate judiciary committee).
195. The Usual Suspects, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 11, 1994, at A14.
196. Jenks, supra note 4 at
197. See supra note 189.
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physical or mental health"198 of candidates may as well. Mr. Jenks
acknowledges that holding discussions about candidates in closed
session helps to promote the candid discussions of potentially diffi-
cult personal issues that are necessary to select the best appli-
cants. 199 Private deliberations are a staple of "merit selection"
systems nationally20 0 because they encourage free and open dis-
cussions. The Open Meetings Law appears to give the Commission
the freedom to decide that in the interest of candor, discussions
about the qualifications, character, and fitness of particular appli-
cants should be closed to the public. Deliberations are the only
step in the Commission process that is not open to the public.20 '
The Commission has struck an appropriate balance. 20 2
However, it appears that under the Open Meetings Law, all
applicants have the right to insist that discussions about their job
performance, character, or mental health be held at an open meet-
ing.20 3 The judicial selection statute may need to be amended to
specifically permit closed sessions in all instances to discuss the
relative merits of candidates.
The public can also participate in the process by testifying at
the Commission's public hearings. Members of the public, lawyers
and non-lawyers alike, have commented on various applicants, and
many interested members of the public and media have attended
the hearings. This pre-selection public scrutiny and participation
is essential to public confidence. Thus, the Commission should not,
as it did with the last superior court vacancy, cut the hearings
short by imposing an arbitrary one witness per candidate rule.20 4
All members of the public should have the opportunity to offer tes-
198. The Commission is currently considering the impact on its work of the
proscription in the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1990) of preemployment inquiries about a job applicant's disability. Id.
§ 12112(d)(2)(A). See generally Goldschmidt, supra note 153, at 58-65.
199. See generally, Jenks, supra note 4 at 77-79.
200. Goldschmidt, supra note 153, at 16, 34.
201. Id. at 34.
202. Id.
203. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-5(a)(1) (providing that a public body may hold a
meeting closed to the public for discussions of the job performance, character, or
mental health of a person, "provided that such person . . . may require that the
discussion be held at an open meeting.") (emphasis added)
204. See supra p. 113.
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timony, both favorable and unfavorable, with respect to any candi-
date being considered by the Commission. 20
D. The Voting Procedure
Requiring commissioners to register their preferences in pub-
lic also assures an important measure of accountability. Any inter-
ested individual can observe or review the votes of commissioners
to attempt to detect political favoritism or bias.
Governor Almond has, I think unjustly, criticized the Commis-
sion's voting procedure because he would like the Commission to
send him the maximum number of five candidates for each judicial
vacancy. The governor's criticism should be considered in light of
the Commission's actual performance. Of the nine lists the Com-
mission has created to fill judicial vacancies, only three have had
fewer than five names. 20 6 Moreover since the Commission
changed its rules in response to Governor Almond's public com-
plaints about receiving only four names to fill a position on the
supreme court,20 7 the governor has received five names for each
vacancy. 208
The Governor's insistence on receiving five names also ignores
the fact that for each judicial vacancy, the Commission by statute
must nominate "not less than three (3) nor more than five (5)
highly qualified persons,"20 9 and that "[aill names submitted to the
governor by the commission shall be approved by at least five (5)
members of the commission voting in favor of each selection." 210 It
makes sense to write rules, as the Commission has, that would re-
sult in a list of five candidates when a majority of Commission
members find there are five or more highly qualified candidates.
However, to the extent that the Governor is attempting to force the
Commission to produce a list of five when a majority can only agree
that three or four are highly qualified, his actions are contrary to
the language of the statute. The statute gives each commissioner
205. It is too early in the public hearing process to conclude that the hearings
are a meaningless exercise in which the candidates simply try to outdo each other
by orchestrating a large showing of support.
206. See supra pp. 93, 102.
207. See supra p. 105.
208. See supra pp. 106, 112, 114.
209. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-5(a) (supreme court vacancies); id. § 8-16.1-6(a)
(lower court vacancies).
210. Id. § 8-16.1-2(d).
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the independent right to decide that no more than three applicants
meet the highest standards. While Governor Almond has repeat-
edly asserted that he supports "merit selection," his position on
this issue makes clear his desire, which is likely to be shared by
every governor, for the greatest number of options to fill each
vacancy.211
E. Gubernatorial Selection and Legislative Confirmation
Governor Almond's preference for a judicial selection system
that gave him more power is also evident from his comments in the
face of Judge Pfeiffer's withdrawal. That withdrawal left the Gov-
ernor with a list of four candidates to choose from. Even assuming
the Governor genuinely believed that an important statutory inter-
pretation question was presented when he thereafter requested a
new list, his public suggestion of names he wanted to see on the
new list seemed inconsistent with the Commission's statutory re-
sponsibility to independently screen applicants and the Governor's
211. Russell Garland & Scott MacKay, In 96, Almond Says He Needs to Deliver,
Prov. J. Bull., Dec. 31, 1995, at Al, A15 (reporting Almond's comments that "the
governor, who is answerable to the people, [should] make the appointments from
as wide a list as he can get.").
Legislation has been introduced in the Senate this session to amend the selec-
tion statute to require the Commission to provide at least three names to the gov-
ernor for each judicial vacancy, but to put no ceiling on the number the
Commission could recommend for a vacancy. 96-S 2657, Jan. Sess. (1996). Not
surprisingly, Governor Almond has supported this amendment. He has argued
that the five name ceiling is "artificial" and "preclude[s] many highly qualified
court applicants from a chance." Letter from Joseph Larisa, Jr., Executive Counsel
to Honorable Domenic DiSandro, III, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee
(March 25, 1996). While the number five may not be magic, "the number should be
sufficiently low so that the commission nominates only the most qualified candi-
dates." Goldschmidt, supra note 153, at 15 (quoting from the American Judicature
Society, Model Judicial Selection Provisions (1984 revised 1994)). Without the up-
per limit, marginal candidates might be added to the list to avoid stigmatizing
candidates left off. Lifting the ceiling could open the door to the kinds of political
selections the statute was intended to eliminate, id. at 22-23, because each com-
missioner would have an unlimited supply of yes votes to use to make deals. Gov-
ernor Almond's other argument in support of his amendment is surely
disingenuous. His counsel has argued that as the statute is presently written,
"some members of the Commission may feel they are to submit only three names."
Id. I am quite certain that the five lawyers, the doctor, the biology professor, the
blood transfusion specialist and the vice-president for human resources on the
Commission understood the statute's requirement that they submit to the gover-
nor a list of "not less than three (3) and not more than five (5) highly qualified
persons for each vacancy." R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-5 (Supp. 1994).
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obligation to select from that list. While one might disagree with
the Commission's assessment of the relative merits of the candi-
dates, in ordering the Commission to provide at least one new
name the governor was asking it for its sixth choice, and the candi-
dates he backed publicly, Margaret Curran and U.S. Magistrate
Judge Robert Lovegreen, had received zero and two votes respec-
tively when the Commission reviewed their applications just
weeks before. 212
The Governor's intentions became clearer when, even though
he had insisted that his request for a fifth name did not mean he
was dissatisfied with the remaining four names on the list, he
chose Robert Flanders, the sixth candidate, to join the court. It is
incumbent on all participants in the new selection process to recog-
nize that the Nominating Commission, the Governor, and the
members of the General Assembly share responsibility and author-
ity for selecting judges and that all participants in the process
should exercise their responsibility at all times in the public
interest.213
212. See supra note 109.
213. Governor Sundlun, who like Governor Almond supported merit selection,
also did the Commission no favors in the summer of 1994 when the Commission
commenced its work. Rather than notifying it of one vacancy or one set of vacan-
cies at a time, the governor asked the Commission to begin filling all the existing
vacancies at once. The Commission had not yet created rules and regulations to
govern its work, and it had only 45 days to fill those vacancies. Moreover, after
Governor Sundlun selected many sitting judges to serve on other courts, which
created more vacancies to fill, he asked the Commission to begin to fill the vacan-
cies immediately, even before his initial selections were confirmed. After he
named Workers' Compensation Judge John Rotondi to fill a position on the family
court he notified the Commission immediately that it should create a list to fill the
vacancy on the workers' compensation court that would be created by Rotondi's
confirmation. The Commission screened applications, interviewed eleven candi-
dates, and selected three to send to the governor for nomination. The governor
nominated George Salem. However, when Judge Rotondi subsequently withdrew
before his confirmation vote, the vacancy on the workers' compensation court did
not materialize. The Commission's work to fill that vacancy was a waste of time
that could have been avoided if the governor had simply waited until the outcome
of Judge Rotondi's confirmation hearing. See supra pp. 95-96 and note 58.
Thus, the Commission operated without much reflection or deliberation in the
summer of 1994. It performed extremely well under the circumstances. It did not
have time to reflect until after this large first set of vacancies was filled. That
reflection proved productive, as it resulted in several genuine improvements in the
process. See supra p. 99.
Perhaps Governor Sundlun was motivated by real concern about filling judi-
cial vacancies, many of which had been held up for several months during the leg-
islative process that resulted in passage of the new judicial selection law. Perhaps
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The public's opportunity to comment on candidates does not
cease after the Commission publishes the list of nominees it sends
to the governor. Before the governor makes a selection the public
can debate the relative merits of the nominees. Mr. Jenks cor-
rectly suggested that the time period for the governor to select a
nominee from that list should be increased from the current seven
days for lower court vacancies and ten days for Supreme Court va-
cancies. A simple amendment to the statute can solve this prob-
lem.2 14 An increase in these periods would not only give the
governor more time to deliberate, it would provide an increased
opportunity for interested parties to comment on the relative mer-
its of the candidates, either publicly in the newspapers or by con-
tacting the governor. "By providing the opportunity for public
participation, the governor also fosters public confidence in the fi-
nal appointment."215 Moreover, both Governors Sundlun and Al-
mond have ignored the statutory time limits to give themselves
more opportunity to deliberate. The law should be changed to re-
flect that reality.
Mr. Jenks identified the requirement of separate confirmation
by the House and Senate of supreme court nominees as a serious
flaw in the system.216 Granted, the house confirmation require-
ment was a political compromise necessary to garner support for
the judicial selection statute. However, in return for separate con-
firming power the House gave up its constitutional control over the
selection of supreme court justices. One needs to consider this his-
torical background in evaluating the House's desire to maintain
some role in the selection of supreme court justices.21 7
Whether or not the House's insistence on maintaining some
role for itself in judicial selection is ideal, it seems the people of
Rhode Island got much more in the process than they lost. While
there may be some duplication of effort in separate confirmations,
he simply wanted to fill as many vacancies as he could before he was replaced by a
new governor. Regardless, his headlong rush resulted in a frenzied summer for
the commissioners. A New Process of Nominating Judges Tested, supra note 27, at
A3 (reporting that the Commission faced a "daunting task" when it began its
work).
214. For example, 96-S 2657, Jan. Sess. 1996 would give the governor thirty
days to make a selection. Id.
215. Goldschmidt, supra note 153, at 17.
216. Jenks, supra note 4 at 73.
217. In only two other states, Virginia and South Carolina, does the legislature
control selection of supreme court justices. Goldschmidt, supra note 153, at 13.
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supreme court vacancies are infrequent, notwithstanding the expe-
rience of the last several months, and they are enormously impor-
tant. It is not unreasonable for both legislative bodies to confirm
an individual who will be appointed for life to one of five seats on
the state's highest court. As the confirmation proceedings involv-
ing Judge Rotondi and Judge Pfeiffer demonstrated, the legisla-
ture may debate issues during confirmation that the Nominating
Commission and the Governor did not believe should disqualify a
candidate. Legislative confirmation is the important democratic
check on the judiciary, which in all other respects is intentionally
insulated from representative forces.
Mr. Jenks correctly criticizes as poorly drafted the provisions
of the statute that address the procedures to be followed in the
event a candidate selected by the governor is not confirmed. 218 In
fact, that poor draftsmanship required the governor to seek an ad-
visory opinion from the supreme court to determine how to proceed
subsequent to Judge Pfeiffer's withdrawal. The supreme court's
decision has resolved the ambiguity. The commission must pro-
vide a new list to the governor if 1) a nominee withdraws, 2) the
legislature fails to act, or 3) the nominee is rejected. If the nomi-
nee dies or becomes disabled before confirmation, the governor
must select from the original list.2 19
However, as Mr. Jenks points out, the statute does not address
the question of how to proceed in what appears to be the unlikely
event that the governor fails to select a name from the list for-
warded by the commission. Mr. Jenks suggests that the statute
should provide that in such a circumstance the chief justice or act-
ing chief justice of the supreme court should choose from the
list.220 However, the new selection statute creates a system of
shared power among the legislature, the governor, and the com-
mission. It would seem more consistent with that scheme if, in the
event the governor elects not to fulfill his or her obligation, the list
218. Jenks, supra note 4 at 81.
219. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 668 A.2d 1246, 1250 (R.I. 1996).
The Lieutenant Governor has introduced legislation this term that provides that
in the event the confirming authority fails to confirm a nominee or if a nominee
withdraws for any reason, the governor must select from the remaining names on
the list, unless only two names remain. Any new list must have three to five
names and may include one or both names from the original list passed over by the
governor. 96-S 2656, Jan. Sess. (1996).
220. Jenks, supra note 4.
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moves to the legislature, with the nominee to be selected by the
senate in the case of the lower courts and the grand committee in
the case of the supreme court.
CONCLUSION
I have watched the Commission at every step. Its rules and
regulations are the product of its attempts to fulfill the statutory
obligation to select highly qualified candidates for Rhode Island's
courts. In trying to adopt procedures that will help them accom-
plish their goal, the Chair and the other members of the Commis-
sion have considered the comments of any organization or
interested citizen who took the time to offer them. There is every
reason to believe they will continue to do so. There are obviously
areas where the statute and the Commission's rules and regula-
tions should be changed, and the discussion about proposed
changes is helpful. The most important thing interested people
can do is participate in and observe closely the new judicial selec-
tion process to assure that, as often as possible, the best judges are
selected to serve on Rhode Island's judiciary. A process has been
put in place that looks like it can accomplish the goal. Interested
citizens should to seize the opportunity to participate in and im-
prove the process.
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